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 Eyre was charged as an accomplice to aggravated robbery after Jesse 
Rakes—the principal actor—attempted to take the vehicle of the alleged victim. In 
initiating contact with the alleged victim, Rakes relied on the false claim that he 
needed assistance in jump starting his car. One of the State’s primary theories of 
accomplice liability was that Eyre aided the aggravated robbery by searching for 
jumper cables. Yet, evidence showed that Eyre thought the robbery was a “bad [] 
idea” and did not want to participate. Despite this evidence, trial counsel did not 
object to the accomplice elements instruction, which understated accomplice 
liability’s mens rea requirement. This instruction was flawed because it did not 
explain to the jury that Eyre needed to act with the intent that aggravated robbery 
be committed. Eyre argues that trial counsel’s failure to object to the incorrect 
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instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, this Court should 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
A new trial is warranted for another reason: the jury was allowed to replay 
Eyre’s videotaped police interview during deliberations. The trial court correctly 
recognized that the jury’s viewing of the interview was improper. But the trial 
court erred in determining that the error was harmless and that a mistrial was 
not warranted. Finally, Eyre argues that the cumulative effect of the errors 
undermines confidence that he had a fair trial. 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue I: Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by 
failing to object to an instruction that understated accomplice liability’s mens rea 
requirement. 
Standard of Review/Preservation: This Court reviews challenges to jury 
instructions for correctness. Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ¶20, 993 P.2d 191. 
The issue is not preserved. But it can be reached under the doctrine of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, which is an exception to the preservation rule and is 
reviewed as a matter of law. See, e.g., State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, ¶28, 276 
P.3d 1207. 
Issue II: Whether the trial court should have granted Eyre’s mistrial 
motion where the jury was allowed to replay Eyre’s videotaped police interview 
during deliberations. 
Standard of Review/Preservation: A trial court’s ruling on a motion for 
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mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, ¶19, 
982 P.2d 79. This issue is preserved. R.240-45 (memorandum in support of 
mistrial); 248-54 (State’s memorandum in opposition); 257-62 (ruling); 872-82 
(discussion, argument, and motion for mistrial); 912-15 (additional argument and 
ruling). Moreover, the issue may be reviewed for ineffective assistance. 
Issue 3: Whether cumulative error requires reversal. 
Standard of Review/Preservation: A claim of cumulative error “requires 
[this Court] to apply the standard of review applicable to each underlying claim of 
error.” Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, ¶4, 172 P.3d 668. 
Preservation is inapplicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS  
a. Background 
On the morning of August 28, 2016, Boyfriend and Girlfriend1 went to “the 
shelter” area and parked their Dodge Challenger on 300 South between 500 and 
600 West. R.549-52, 632. Girlfriend was a heroin addict and was looking to 
purchase drugs in the area. R.632, 650.  
A PT Cruiser occupied by Eyre, Michael Polk, and Jesse Rakes was parked 
nearby. See R.553-54, 583, 758. At some point, Rakes approached Girlfriend and 
Boyfriend. R.553-54, 591. Rakes asked Boyfriend if Boyfriend would “help jump 
their vehicle because it wouldn’t start.” R.553. Boyfriend offered to help. R.554-
55, 635. 
                                                 
1 Eyre refers to the alleged victims as “Boyfriend” and “Girlfriend” 
throughout this brief. 
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Boyfriend, the driver of the Challenger, then pulled his vehicle to the east 
of the PT Cruiser, parking it “[n]ose to nose” with the other vehicle in a “‘V’ 
shape.” R.555-56, 600, 636; see State’s Ex. 1. Girlfriend remained in the 
Challenger as Boyfriend got out, popped the hood, and stood in between the 
vehicles next to the Challenger’s front passenger side. R.554-56, 635-36. 
 At this point, Polk and Eyre had also exited the vehicle and were in the 
back of PT Cruiser “rummaging around” in the trunk; Girlfriend and Boyfriend 
thought they were looking for jumper cables. R.556, 626, 637-38, 652. Rakes 
joined Boyfriend in between the cars and the two engaged small talk. R.556, 598, 
638-39, 650-51.  
According to Girlfriend and Boyfriend, Rakes then lifted up his shirt and 
flashed a pistol that was tucked into his waistband. R.557-58, 591-92, 639. 
Girlfriend and Boyfriend provided conflicting testimony regarding whether Eyre 
flashed a pistol as well. Compare R.652-59, 663, with R.558-61. 
Rakes then announced, “[y]ou know what this is.” R.560, 600, 639-40. 
Next, he said something to the effect of “I’m” or “we’re” taking your car and your 
belongings, though the testimony was inconsistent regarding precisely what was 
said. R.560, 593-96, 600-01, 639-40, 814-15. He then threatened, “[g]et your 
bitch out of the car. I’m going to pistol whip her.” R.560, 600, 639-40. 
 Boyfriend had a gun in the Challenger, and without anyone noticing, 
Girlfriend passed the gun to Boyfriend through the passenger side window. 
R.560-61, 601-02, 641-42. Shortly after doing so, a gunshot was fired; Boyfriend 
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had shot Rakes. R.562-63, 583-84, 641-42, 657. 
Boyfriend testified that he shot Rakes in self-defense. R.562-63, 609. 
According to Boyfriend, Rakes drew a gun in Boyfriend’s direction at which point 
Boyfriend fired. R.562-63. Rakes staggered and fell to the ground. Id. The shot 
left Rakes fatally wounded, and Rakes died that day from the wounds inflicted by 
the shot. R.583-84. Soon after the shooting, Eyre left the scene. R.768-69, 787-
88, 804-05. 
 Girlfriend and Boyfriend started to drive away. R.563-65, 642-45. As they 
were doing so, the PT Cruiser—driven by Eyre’s co-defendant, Michael Polk—hit 
the Challenger’s rear end. R.564-65, 605, 644-45, 787; State’s Ex. 10 (facing west 
at 7:25:40-7:26:05). The impact caused the PT Cruiser to flip, but Polk was able 
to exit. Id.; State’s Exs. 5, 10 (facing west at 7:26:05-7:27:00). Girlfriend and 
Boyfriend drove away. R.645.  
Back at the crime scene, “a bunch of people” had rushed towards Rakes 
and the flipped PT Cruiser. R.645-46; State’s Ex. 10 (facing west at 7:27:00). 
According to police, these people robbed Rakes and took items from the PT 
Cruiser. R.645-46, 733. 
 Girlfriend and Boyfriend parked nearby and prepared for the arrival of the 
police. R.565, 645. Boyfriend and Girlfriend were restricted persons, so Girlfriend 
got rid of Boyfriend’s gun before police got there. R.566-69, 585, 660, 606-07, 
645-47. To alter his appearance, Boyfriend also changed his shirt. R.567. 
 Police arrived and arrested Boyfriend. R.584. Although Girlfriend 
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successfully disposed of Boyfriend’s gun and ammunition, a search of Boyfriend’s 
Challenger revealed an ounce of marijuana, a gun cleaning kit, a scale for 
measuring drugs, and 37 bags of suspected spice (which ultimately tested 
negative for a controlled substance). R.586, 737-38. Officers also found a 
magazine to a pistol in the PT Cruiser. R.733-35. But other than that, police 
found “very little physical evidence” at the scene of the crime, which was 
“compromised” by the various individuals who rushed to the scene. R.732. Police 
never recovered a gun from Rakes’s person. R.790. 
 Police spoke to a witness who observed a man in a dark hoody run from the 
crime scene. R.670-74, 711-15, 804-07. This information led an officer to stop 
Eyre near 800 West 800 South. R.714-15.  The officer initially let Eyre go after he 
denied involvement, but the officer later learned that detectives wanted to speak 
with Eyre. R.716-19. Eyre was arrested near 425 West 1300 South and was 
subsequently interviewed. R.719-20. No gun was found on his person. R.725-26. 
 Based on this incident, the State charged Eyre with aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony, under a theory of accomplice liability. R.1-7, 66-68. The State 
also alleged that Eyre committed this crime in concert with two or more people 
and sought enhancement under Utah Code § 76-3-203.1. After a preliminary 
hearing, Eyre was bound over on this charge. R.62-65, 294-446. 
b. Trial 
A two-day jury trial was held on October 17-18, 2017. R.196-201. Through 
its witnesses—among them, Girlfriend and Boyfriend—the State presented the 
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evidence outlined above. See supra section a. The testimony of Girlfriend and 
Boyfriend, however, differed regarding the extent of Eyre’s involvement. 
Compare R.652-59, 663, with R.558-61. To try to prove its case, the State also 
introduced Eyre’s interview with the police. R.751-72; State’s Ex. 11. After the 
presentation of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury regarding accomplice 
liability. R.222, 226-28. And ultimately, the jury found Eyre guilty as charged. 
R.230-31, 884. 
 Boyfriend and Girlfriend offer different accounts regarding Eyre’s 
involvement: Girlfriend testified that she first observed Eyre at the back of the PT 
Cruiser digging through the trunk. R.652. To Girlfriend’s knowledge, that is 
where he stayed. Id. Eyre did not say anything or do anything that Girlfriend 
viewed as threatening. R.655-59. While Girlfriend observed Rakes flash his 
weapon, she did not observe Eyre flash a gun or leave the trunk area. R.655-57. 
Girlfriend testified that she believed Eyre did nothing to further the crime. R.663. 
Meanwhile, Boyfriend testified Eyre left the trunk area and joined Rakes in 
between the cars. R.558-60. Eyre stood side by side with Rakes and “flashed a 
pistol” that was under his shirt. R.558-61, 579, 601. Boyfriend considered Eyre a 
threat, and after shooting Rakes, attempted to shoot Eyre as well. R.563, 578-80. 
The gun, however, misfired. Id. Boyfriend then became focused on leaving the 
scene and lost sight of Eyre. R.564, 603. 
 Through cross-examination, the defense highlighted various 
inconsistencies between Boyfriend’s trial testimony and preliminary hearing 
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testimony. E.g. R.551, 581-83 (inconsistency regarding whether Boyfriend was in 
the area with a purpose to buy drugs); R.590-91 (inconsistency regarding 
whether Rakes asked if Boyfriend would jump start “his” car or “our” car). The 
defense also put on witnesses and elicited testimony seeking to demonstrate that 
Boyfriend’s story changed over time. E.g. R.816-17 (officer testifying that 
Boyfriend never mentioned anything about a second man who flashed a gun). 
Moreover, the defense emphasized that based on the incident Boyfriend faced 
charges for second degree felony possession of a firearm by a restricted person. 
R.608-14; see also 568-70. But the State offered Boyfriend a class A 
misdemeanor in exchange for testifying “truth[fully]” at Eyre’s trial. Id. Finally, 
the defense sought to undermine Boyfriend’s testimony that Eyre was armed by 
presenting evidence that a man resembling Eyre appeared to be shielding himself 
as he fled from the scene. R.805-06; see also R.856. Additionally, no weapon was 
recovered from Eyre. R.725-26. 
Eyre’s interview. Eyre did not testify, but his videotaped police interview 
was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 11 and was played for the jury. See R.751-
72, 872-73. In his interview, Eyre initially told police that he did not witness or 
know anything about the incident. R.752. Subsequently, Eyre admitted to being 
present and looking for cables to jump start the PT Cruiser’s “d[ea]d” battery, but 
did not mention that Rakes “tried to take [Boyfriend’s] car.” R.758-61, 763-65. 
When police told Eyre that Rakes had died, Eyre became emotional and gave the 
following account. R.761; State’s Ex. 11.  
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Rakes, Polk, and Eyre had been sitting in the parked PT Cruiser for about 
2-3 minutes when Rakes looked over and saw the Challenger. R.765-767, 769, 
773. Rakes announced that he wanted to take it. See R.765, 767. Eyre wanted no 
part in driving around in a stolen car and warned Rakes that “[i]t [was] a bad ass 
idea.” R.765; State’s Ex. 11 (9:07-9:25).  
Before exiting the PT Cruiser, Rakes “said he was going to ask for a jump 
start.” R.767, 773; State’s Ex. 11 (11:25-11:40). “As soon as [Rakes] got out of the 
car, he started spinning”—or telling a “bullshit” story about—the “jump thing.” 
R.772-73; State’s Ex. 11 (14:00-14:30); State’s Ex. 11 (9:45-9:50).2 At some point, 
Rakes told Eyre to look for jumper cables and told Polk to pop the hood. R.767, 
773; State’s Ex. 11 (11:35-11:45). Eyre proceeded to look for jumper cables in the 
back. R.773. According to Eyre, Rakes was “running the [] show.” R.766. In an 
earlier version of the story, Eyre said he eventually stated that they did not have 
cables. R.760, 773. 
When asked about the “plan,” Eyre told police, “We didn't have a plan …. 
Didn't plan shit.” R.766; see also R.770; State’s Ex. 11 (15:43-16:05) (officer 
asking Eyre in the interview what Polk thought about the idea, and Eyre 
responding, “It wasn’t really talked about. It wasn’t discussed”).  
Just prior to the shooting, Rakes said something to Boyfriend. R.760, 773, 
                                                 
2 At trial, the detective testified that Eyre said in the interview that “as soon 
as they got in the area, Jesse started spinning this whole fuckin' jump start 
thing.” R.772 (emphasis added). But in Exhibit 11, Eyre can be heard saying: “As 
soon as [Rakes] got out of the car, he started spinning this whole fuckin’ jump 
thing.” State’s Ex. 11 (14:00-14:30). 
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775. But Eyre joined them at the front of the car toward the end of their 
conversation, so he could not hear what was said. R.760, 773-75. Eyre then 
observed Boyfriend run in front of the Challenger and Rakes run after him. 
R.768, 774-75. Rakes was then shot, and he told Eyre, “run.” R.760, 768, 788. 
After that, Eyre left the scene. R.768-69, 788; State’s Ex. 11 (13:12-13:35). 
Moreover, Eyre told police that he did not flash or possess a gun that day; he did 
not know if Rakes had a gun; and he did not know what Rakes was doing when 
Rakes was shot. R.760, 768; State’s Ex. 11 (11:55-12:35). 
Exhibit 11 was 23 minutes and 27 seconds long. See State’s Ex. 11. But only 
about the first 17 minutes and 45 seconds was played for the jury in open court. 
See R.751-72; State’s Ex. 11. In the remaining portion, the detective expresses his 
opinion that Eyre “w[ould] probably go to jail for robbery.” See State’s Ex. 11 
(17:50-20:15). The recording also shows police handcuffing and taking mugshots 
of Eyre. See State’s Ex. 11 (17:50-23:15). The recording ends with footage of police 
taking Eyre into custody. See State’s Ex. 11 (23:05-23:27). 
Jury Instructions. The State proceeded on a theory of accomplice liability 
and the jury was instructed accordingly. See R.847-48, 222, 226-28; see also 
Addendum A (relevant jury instructions). Instruction 40, which set forth the 
elements of party liability, told the jury that a defendant is guilty as an 
accomplice if: “(1) the defendant intentionally, (2) solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided another to commit the offense, 
AND (3) the offense was committed.” R.227 (bolding in original). Defense 
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counsel stipulated to the inclusion of this instruction. R.706. 
c. Eyre’s motion for mistrial. 
On the second day of trial, Exhibit 11—Eyre’s videotaped police interview—
was offered and admitted into evidence by the State. R.751, 872-73. According to 
defense counsel, there was an agreement between the parties that the interview 
could be played for the jury. R.872. While the prosecutor had a different 
understanding of the agreement, R.872-73, defense counsel was under the 
impression that Exhibit 11 would not go into the jury room during deliberations. 
R.872, 875. Based on defense counsel’s understanding, the defense stipulated to 
the “blanket admission” of all exhibits, including Exhibit 11. R.799, 875. All of the 
exhibits went back into the jury room. R.870-71. 
During deliberations, the jury requested a computer with which to view the 
video exhibits.R.248-49, 873. Defense counsel believed that the jury sought to 
review different video exhibits—not Exhibit 11. R.873. Accordingly, a computer 
was provided. R.249, 873. When it occurred to defense counsel that Exhibit 11 
might have gone into the jury room, defense counsel immediately notified a court 
employee, and the computer was retrieved. R.873-74. The bailiff confirmed that 
the jury watched Exhibit 11 in the jury room. R.874. The jury had the ability to 
access Exhibit 11 for 20 minutes. R.259, 873-74. When the recording was 
stopped, it appeared that seven minutes remained on the recording. R.880. 
Defense counsel brought the issue to the court’s attention and moved for a 
mistrial on the grounds that Exhibit 11 may have improperly influenced the jury. 
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R.874. The trial court ultimately ruled that the issue was timely raised and took 
the mistrial motion under advisement pending the jury verdict. R.877-79, 886-
87. While the court reserved its ruling, it thought “on [the] face of” things that 
there was no prejudice, pointing to its belief that “[t]he jury ha[d] not been 
exposed to anything … new or different.” R.879-80. Defense counsel clarified that 
Exhibit 11 contained footage that had not been played for the jury at trial. R.880-
81. After the verdict, the court ordered briefing on the mistrial motion. R.886-87. 
In his brief, Eyre argued that replaying the police interview permitted the 
jury to place undue emphasis on the recording—“the State’s most persuasive 
evidence against Eyre.” R.243; see also Addendum B (defendant’s memorandum 
in support of mistrial). Thus, Eyre argued, a mistrial should be declared. Id. 
Meanwhile, the State argued that Eyre waived any objection because Eyre 
stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 11. R.249-53; see also Addendum B (State’s 
opposition memorandum). Alternatively, it argued that a mistrial was not 
warranted on the merits. Id. 
The trial court memorialized its decision in a written order. R.257-60; 
Addendum C (ruling). There, the court evidently rejected the State’s waiver 
argument and ruled on the issue. Id. The court determined that the “jury’s 
viewing of Exhibit 11 in the jury room during deliberations was improper.” R.259. 




At sentencing, the trial court entertained further argument on the mistrial 
motion. R.912-15. Defense counsel added that the jury was “deliberating for some 
time” before they requested Eyre’s interview, indicating “confusion or discussion 
about what [Eyre] may have said to the police.” R.913-14. But upon reviewing 
Eyre’s interview, they came back with a verdict “shortly thereafter.” Id. Based on 
this, counsel argued, the error was not harmless. Id. The trial court once again 
denied the motion for lack of prejudice. R.915.3  
Eyre was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 10 years-to-life (in 
concert enhanced). R.266-268; see also Addendum D (Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment). Eyre timely appealed. R.269-70. This appeal was transferred from 
the Utah Supreme Court to this Court. R.284-87. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Issue I. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to 
object to an instruction that understated accomplice liability’s mens rea. To be 
guilty as an accomplice to aggravated robbery, Eyre needed to act “intentionally,” 
i.e., he needed to act with the intent or desire to cause aggravated robbery. The 
elements instruction on accomplice liability omitted this critical requirement. 
Instead, the instruction suggested that the intentional mental state attached only 
to the actions of “solicited, requested, commanded, or encouraged, or 
intentionally aided.”  The instructions as a whole did not cure this deficiency. 
 Moreover, the instructional error improperly allowed jurors to convict if 
                                                 




they found that Eyre acted with an objective other than the desire to cause 
aggravated robbery. In effect, the error reduced the State’s burden of proof. Thus, 
trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to an instruction that made 
it easier for the jury to convict.  
 Lastly, counsel’s failure to object to the instruction undermines confidence 
in the verdict. There was record evidence that Eyre did not intend for his conduct 
to cause aggravated robbery. Indeed, the jury heard that Eyre did not want Rakes 
to commit the crime and did not want to take part in its commission. Moreover, 
the jury had reason to doubt Boyfriend’s claim that Eyre participated in the 
robbery by flashing a gun. Thus, Eyre was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to 
ensure that the jury was correctly instructed. 
Issue II. This Court should grant Eyre a new trial because the jury 
improperly viewed Eyre’s videotaped police interview during deliberations. The 
trial court correctly recognized that this was error. The trial court nevertheless 
denied Eyre a mistrial based on the erroneous determination that this error was 
harmless. Contrary to the trial court’s suggestion, the replaying of the video 
detrimentally emphasized Eyre’s interview. Moreover, the record suggests that 
the improper emphasis likely influenced the verdict. The trial court also relied on 
an incorrect understanding of prejudice law in reaching its determination. A 
mistrial was required because it is reasonably likely that but for the jury’s viewing 
of the interview, Eyre would have enjoyed a more favorable outcome. This issue is 
preserved, but if not, the issue may be reviewed for ineffective assistance. 
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Issue III: Cumulative error requires reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing 
to object to an instruction that incorrectly stated the elements of 
accomplice liability. 
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel protects 
criminal defendants against attorney errors that undermine confidence in the 
verdicts. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-94 (1984). To 
establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
demonstrate both “that counsel's performance was deficient” and “that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. 
When evaluating “whether trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to 
object to [] jury instructions, [this Court] must first consider whether those 
instructions were legally correct.” State v. Liti, 2015 UT App 186, ¶12. This Court 
then asks “whether trial counsel performed deficiently by not objecting to the 
erroneous instructions.” Id. ¶18. Finally, this Court asks whether the defense was 
prejudiced by the failure to object.  State v. Grunwald, 2018 UT App 46, ¶23.  
In this case, trial counsel erred in the most fundamental of ways by failing 
to ensure that the jury understood the elements of the alleged crime. The 
problem lied in the elements instruction on accomplice liability, which 
understated the mens rea necessary to be guilty as an accomplice. Specifically, it 
failed to explain to the jury that Eyre needed to possess a culpable mental state 
with respect to the commission of the principal crime, i.e., he needed to act with 
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the intent that aggravated robbery be committed. See infra Part I.A. This critical 
omission reduced the State’s burden of proving Eyre guilty of the statutorily 
required elements. See infra Part I.A-B. Accordingly, counsel performed 
deficiently by failing ensure that the jury was correctly instructed on the 
elements. See infra Part I.B. Moreover, this failure prejudiced Eyre. See infra 
Part I.C. 
A. The elements instruction on accomplice liability was incorrect. 
The mens rea element “ought to be explicitly explained to a jury.” State v. 
Bird, 2015 UT 7, ¶19 (citing State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ¶43). The elements 
instruction on accomplice liability did not do that in this case.  
Eyre was charged “as a party” to aggravated robbery. R.66-68. Party 
liability, more commonly known as accomplice liability, is set forth in Utah Code 
§ 76-2-202, which states: “[e]very person, acting with the mental state required 
for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct.” Utah Code § 76-2-202; Addendum E (relevant statutes). 
“Accomplice liability requires that the defendant act ‘with the mental state 
required for the commission of [the principal] offense.’” Grunwald, 2018 UT App 
46, ¶33 (alteration in original) (quoting Utah Code § 76-2-202). In other words, 
“an accomplice cannot be convicted based on a lesser mental state than that 
required to commit the underlying offense.” Id.  
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Here, the underlying offense of aggravated robbery requires intentional 
conduct. See Utah Code § 76-6-301, 302; see also Addendum E (relevant 
statutes). Accordingly, an accomplice to aggravated robbery acts “with the mental 
state required for the commission of [the principal] offense” when he acts 
intentionally. Utah Code §§ 76-6-301, 76-2-202. 
But intentionally “in regard to what?” Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ¶44. The Utah 
Supreme Court answered that question in Jeffs, which held that the defendant 
must act with the intent that the underlying crime be committed. Id. ¶¶42-44; see 
also Addendum F. In Jeffs, the defendant was charged as an accomplice to rape. 
Id. ¶17.  At trial, the defense was denied an instruction that would have required 
the State to prove that the defendant “intended that the result of his conduct 
would be that [the principal] rape [the victim].” Id. ¶40.  
The Utah Supreme Court held that the elements instruction on accomplice 
liability was deficient, and thus, the defendant was entitled to the requested 
instruction. Id. ¶¶42-52. The main problem with the elements instruction was 
that it failed to connect the required mental state to the underlying crime. Id. 
¶42. That is, the instructions “only indicated that the reckless, knowing, or 
intentional mental state attached to the actions of ‘solicited, requested, 
commanded, or encouraged,’ not to the underlying criminal conduct of rape.” Id. 
The court held that this was error. Id. 4 
                                                 
4 The accomplice elements instruction in Jeffs stated as follows: 
To convict Warren Jeffs as an accomplice to the crime of rape, you 
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In reaching its conclusion, the Jeffs court considered the accomplice 
statute’s requirement that a defendant act “with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense.” Id. ¶44; Utah Code § 76-2-202. Because the 
underlying crime of rape required intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct, 
accomplice liability required that the defendant act “intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly.” Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ¶44. “But,” the Jeffs court asked, “intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly in regard to what?” Id.  
In answering this question, the court rejected an argument that the 
defendant could “act intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly in the abstract.” Id. 
¶46. Instead, the court held that the defendant “must act intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly as to the results of his conduct. And in order for criminal 
liability to attach, the results of his conduct must be a criminal offense.” Id. ¶44. 
For instance, in prosecuting a defendant as an accomplice to an intentional 
underlying offense—such as aggravated robbery—the State would need to prove 
                                                                                                                                                             
must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that crime: 
1. That the defendant, Warren Jeffs: 
a. intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly solicited, requested, 
commanded, or encouraged another— 
I. to have sexual intercourse 
ii. with Elissa Wall without consent; or 
b. intentionally aided another— 
I. to have sexual intercourse 
ii. with Elissa Wall without consent; and 
2. Allen Steed had sexual intercourse with Elissa Wall without 
consent. 




that the defendant acted with the “desire[] to cause [the underlying offense].” Id. 
¶45. In short, the accomplice instruction in Jeffs was erroneous because it failed 
to connect the intentional/knowing/reckless mental state to the underlying 
criminal conduct of rape. Id. ¶¶42-52. 
Similarly here, the accomplice elements instruction (Instruction 40) was 
erroneous because it omitted any requirement that Eyre act intentionally with 
respect to the principle crime, aggravated robbery. Instruction 40 stated:  
A person can commit a crime as a “party.” In other words, a 
person can commit a criminal offense even though that person did 
not personally do all of the acts that make up the offense. If you find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
1. the defendant intentionally 
2. solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
intentionally aided another to commit the offense, AND 
3. the offense was committed, 
then you can find the defendant guilty of that offense. 
R.227 (bolding in original). 
Instruction 40 correctly identified the mental state “intentionally” as the 
mens rea required to commit aggravated robbery. Id. But the instruction failed to 
connect this mens rea to the underlying offense of aggravated robbery. Id. In 
other words, nothing told the jury that Eyre needed to “intend[] … that [his] 
conduct would result in the commission” of aggravated robbery. Grunwald, 2018 
UT App 46, ¶36. Instead, as in Jeffs, the instruction erroneously suggested that 
the intentional mental state applied only to the “actions of ‘solicited, requested, 
commanded, [] encouraged,’” or intentionally aided. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ¶42.  
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Moreover, absent an “intent to cause aggravated robbery” requirement, 
Instruction 40—read together with the abstract definition of “intentionally”—
allowed the jury to convict based on a noncriminal intent. The jury was instructed 
that “[a] person acts ‘intentionally’ when his conscious objective is to cause a 
certain result.” R.223. But the definition does not even contemplate that the 
“certain result” be prohibited or criminal. See id. For instance, the jury could 
have found that Eyre acted “intentionally” if—in looking for jumper cables—
Eyre’s only intention was to appease Rakes or to avoid a confrontation with him. 
See id. That and a whole range of mental states could meet the abstract definition 
of “intentional[].” Id.  
In Jeffs, however, the Utah Supreme Court rejected an argument that 
accomplice liability could attach to a defendant who encouraged/aided a crime 
while acting intentionally “in the abstract.” 2010 UT 49, ¶46. For a defendant to 
be guilty as an accomplice, only one intent matters: the intent that the underlying 
crime be committed. See id. ¶¶42-46. The instructions did not state this 
fundamental principle, which resulted in an understated mens rea requirement 
that allowed the jury to convict based on abstract notions of intent.  
This serious error was not cured by the instructions as a whole. Instruction 
41 included the statutory definition of accomplice liability and told the jury that a 
defendant’s “mere presence” at the scene or knowledge of the crime’s commission 
is not enough to convict. R.228. But this statement of law only told the jury what 
accomplice liability was not; it did not explain that accomplice liability requires 
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the desire to cause aggravated robbery. See id.; see also Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ¶45.  
Additionally, the statutory definition of accomplice liability, which was 
repeated in Instructions 39 and 41, was likewise insufficient to remedy the 
erroneous accomplice elements instruction. R.226; see also R.228 (also reciting 
the statutory definition of accomplice liability). Instruction 39, for instance, 
explained that an accomplice must “act[] with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense.” Id. It is a stretch to say that a lay jury would glean 
from this instruction that Eyre needed to act with the intent to cause aggravated 
robbery.  Indeed, even legal professionals have differed regarding the 
interpretation of the phrase, “acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense.” Compare Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ¶46 (State interpreting 
this phrase to require the defendant to “act intentionally … in the abstract and 
incur criminal liability if his actions resulted in … encouraging, or intentionally 
aiding” a crime), with id. ¶¶42-44 (supreme court interpreting the phrase to 
require that a defendant act intentionally with respect to the underlying offense). 
 Nevertheless, even if the jury understood Instruction 39, the jury was not 
given a way to reconcile Instruction 39 with Instruction 40, which—like the 
erroneous instruction in Jeffs—failed to connect a mens rea requirement to the 
underlying crime. See 2010 UT 49, ¶42. Indeed, on the one hand, the unspecific 
statutory definition suggested that a mental state applied to the principle crime, 
while on the other hand, the purported elements instruction did not. See Francis 
v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 322 (1985) (“[l]anguage that merely contradicts and 
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does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve 
the infirmity”); State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶43 (finding error in a verdict 
form that “directly contradicted” a correct instruction on imperfect self-defense). 
Moreover, there is a strong likelihood that the jury relied on Instruction 40 
rather than the statutory definition. In fact, the prosecutor identified Instruction 
40 as the source of law for accomplice liability. See R.848 (prosecutor stating: 
“let's talk about this party liability…. That instruction is Instruction No. 40”).  
In some cases, instructions read as a whole may provide meaning to an 
instruction that is otherwise inadequate standing alone. For instance, in State v. 
Clark, this Court held that the instructions as a whole adequately instructed the 
jury on accomplice liability.5 2014 UT App 56. In that case, it appears that only 
one instruction detailed the principle of accomplice liability. See id. ¶¶52-55. That 
instruction was “copied nearly verbatim from Utah’s accomplice liability statute.” 
Id. ¶52. Then, for each of the counts, the trial court also provided an instruction 
“detailing the elements of each crime, including the required mental state.” Id. 
¶55. Put plainly, the accomplice instruction was correct, as far as it went, because 
it accurately repeated the unspecific accomplice statute. See id. Then the specific 
mental state requirements for each charge were discussed in other instructions. 
See id. Thus, viewed as a whole, the elements for each accomplice charge could be 
determined by putting together the underlying elements instructions and the 
                                                 
5 The evidence in Clark pointed to the defendant acting as a principle actor, 
rather than an accomplice. 2014 UT App 56, ¶55. 
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accomplice instruction. See id. 
  By contrast, the instructions in this case, as a whole, did not cure the 
erroneous accomplice elements instruction. Unlike Clark, this case does not 
involve an unspecific instruction that was clarified by other instructions. See id. 
Rather, as explained, Instruction 40 conflicts with and expounds upon the 
statutory definition in a way that is incorrect. See supra pp. 21-22. 
In short, the accomplice elements instruction incorrectly omitted a 
requirement that Eyre act intentionally with regard to the underlying crime of 
aggravated robbery. And the remaining instructions did not cure this error.  
B. Trial counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous instruction on 
accomplice liability constituted deficient performance. 
The next question in the ineffective assistance analysis is did defense 
counsel perform deficiently for failing to object to the incorrect instruction. Liti, 
2015 UT App 186, ¶18. The answer to this question is yes. “[N]o reasonable 
lawyer would have found advantage in understating the” elements required to 
prove accomplice liability. State v. Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶27. 
Counsel performs deficiently when his “conduct f[alls] below an objective 
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” State v. Ring, 
2018 UT 19, ¶35 (quotation marks omitted). For instance, in Barela—a rape 
case—the Utah Supreme Court held that counsel was deficient for failing to object 
to an instruction that “implied that the mens rea requirement (‘intentionally or 
knowingly’) applied only to the act of sexual intercourse, and not to [the alleged 
victim]’s nonconsent.” 2015 UT 22, ¶¶26-27 (emphasis in original). The Barela 
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court explained that “no reasonable lawyer would have found an advantage in 
understating the mens rea requirement as applied to the victim's nonconsent.” 
Id. ¶27. As the court pointed out, “[t]here is only upside in a complete statement 
of the requirement of mens rea.” Id. 
Likewise, in Grunwald, this Court held that counsel performed deficiently 
by failing to object to erroneous instructions on accomplice liability.  2018 UT 
App 46, ¶42. There, this Court identified three flaws in the accomplice liability 
instructions.  See id. ¶¶32-42. These errors effectively “reduc[ed] the State's 
burden of proof” and allowed the jury to convict under “impermissible 
scenarios”—among them, “if [the defendant] directed her actions to some 
purpose other than the commission of the principal crime.” Id. ¶42. Thus, 
counsel performed deficiently because “no reasonable trial strategy would justify 
trial counsel's failure to object to instructions misstating the elements of 
accomplice liability in a way that reduced the State's burden of proof.” Id; see 
also State v. Apodaca, 2018 UT App 131, ¶36. 
Similarly here, counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the 
incorrect accomplice instructions. The instructions “understat[ed]” accomplice 
liability’s mens rea by omitting any requirement that a mental state apply to the 
underlying offense of aggravated robbery. Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶27. 
Consequently, the instructions allowed the jury to convict under an 
“impermissible scenario[].” Grunwald, 2018 UT App 46, ¶42. That is, the jury 
could convict if they found that Eyre acted with an objective other than “desire[] 
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to cause” aggravated robbery. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ¶45. As in Grunwald, this 
“error[] had the effect of reducing the State's burden of proof at trial.” 2018 UT 
App 46, ¶42. And no reasonable trial strategy would justify allowing an incorrect 
instruction that made it easier for the jury to convict, see id.—particularly where 
defense counsel disputed that Eyre possessed a culpable mind. R.858 (stating 
that Eyre and Polk “could have been thinking, God, (inaudible) knock this off. 
Hoping that their friend would see the light and not do a stupid thing”); see also 
R.852-53. 
The reasonableness of counsel’s actions are further undermined by the 
similarities Instruction 40 shared with the erroneous instruction in Jeffs—a case 
that was established precedent at the time of trial. 2010 UT 49, ¶41. Moreover, 
the instruction departed from the Model Utah Jury Instruction’s sample 
instructions on accomplice liability. See Model Utah Jury Instructions 2d (MUJI) 
CR309A and CR309B. 
Finally, the presence of Instruction 39, which provided the statutory 
definition of accomplice liability, did not relieve counsel of his duty to object. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that counsel has a duty remove ambiguity and 
conflict in instructions that could mislead the jury. See State v. Hutchings, 2012 
UT 50, ¶23. And here, Instruction 40 was incorrect and misleading; it 
understated accomplice liability’s mens rea; and it did not comport to the 
statutory definition of accomplice liability. Thus, counsel was deficient for failing 
to object to it. 
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C. Counsel’s errors prejudiced Eyre. 
The last step in the ineffective assistance analysis is to decide whether 
counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial. Grunwald, 2018 UT App 46, 
¶43. Deficient performance requires reversal when “‘a reasonable probability 
exists that, but for counsel's error, the result would have been different.’” Id. 
(quoting State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355, ¶18). Moreover, when “attempting 
to determine whether the omission of an element from a jury instruction” is 
prejudicial, this Court “‘asks whether the record contains evidence that could 
rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.’” State 
v. Ochoa, 2014 UT App 296, ¶5. 
In this case, there was a reasonable likelihood of a different result but for 
counsel’s failure to ensure that the jury was correctly instructed. According to the 
State’s evidence, Eyre allegedly aided in the aggravated robbery of Boyfriend in 
two ways: (1) Eyre flashed a pistol after Rakes threatened to take Boyfriend’s 
property (“the pistol-flashing theory”); or (2) Eyre looked for jumper cables in the 
back of the PT cruiser, which—according to the State—helped Rakes isolate 
Boyfriend (“the jumper cable theory”).  See R.849-51. While the erroneous 
instructions were prejudicial under any theory, the instructions were particularly 
problematic if the jury convicted upon the jumper cable theory. 
The jury heard compelling evidence upon which they could have doubted 
that Eyre “intended … that [his] conduct”—i.e., looking for jumper cables—
“would result in the commission” of aggravated robbery. Grunwald, 2018 UT 
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App 46, ¶36. Evidence showed that Eyre did not want Rakes to commit the crime 
and did not want to take part in its commission. R.765. Eyre even warned Rakes 
that it was “[i]t [was] a bad ass idea.” Id. He also indicated that he wanted no part 
in driving around in a stolen car. Id.; State’s Ex. 11 (9:07-9:25).  And in closing, 
defense counsel stressed that Eyre thought stealing the car was “stupid.” R.852-
53. Defense counsel also suggested that Eyre lacked a culpable mind. See R.858 
(stating that Eyre and Polk “could have been thinking, God, (inaudible) knock 
this off. Hoping that their friend would see the light and not do a stupid thing”). 
Moreover, evidence demonstrates that there was no mutually agreed upon 
plan to rob Boyfriend. True, Eyre acknowledged that he knew the PT Cruiser did 
not require a jump start, and thus, “[the] jump thing” was something that Rakes 
was “spinning.” See R.766, 772-73; State’s Ex. 11 (14:00-14:30). But “spinning” 
toward what objective? A jury could find that from Eyre’s perspective, the answer 
was not clear.  
The idea of using a “jump start” as a ruse to isolate Boyfriend was not 
something that was discussed by the parties.  See R.766-67.  Rakes did not overtly 
connect the “jump start” idea to the robbery of Boyfriend.  See id. Nor did Rakes 
explain to Eyre how Eyre’s search for jumper cables would advance the plan. See 
id. Rather, evidence shows that Rakes simply said, “he was going to ask for a 
jump start,” and then Rakes ordered Eyre to look for jumper cables. R.767, 773; 
State’s Ex. 11 (11:25-11:40). And importantly, the jury heard evidence that they 
“didn't have a plan …. Didn't plan shit.” R.766. Moreover, Rakes’s idea “wasn’t 
28 
 
really talked about. It wasn’t [] discussed.”  State’s Ex. 11 (15:43-16:16); see also 
R.770. From this, a jury could find that in Eyre’s mind, it was unclear whether 
looking for jumper cables furthered Rakes’s aggravated robbery plans.  
On this record, a jury could perhaps conclude that Eyre acted recklessly 
with regard to the crime’s commission. But to be guilty as an accomplice to 
aggravated robbery, Eyre needed to act with the highest mental state of all: 
intent. And with little evidence of a mutually-understood plan of action—taken   
together with the evidence that Eyre did not want to participate in the crime—the 
jury had reason to doubt that Eyre’s intent in looking for the cables was to cause 
an aggravated robbery. 
 Moreover, it is reasonably likely that at least some jurors convicted based 
upon the jumper cable theory and rejected the pistol-flashing theory. Boyfriend, 
who provided the only evidence that Eyre flashed a weapon, had serious 
credibility problems. Through cross-examination, the defense highlighted various 
inconsistencies between Boyfriend’s trial testimony and preliminary hearing 
testimony. E.g. R.551, 581-83 (inconsistency regarding whether Boyfriend was in 
the area with a purpose to buy drugs); R.590-91 (inconsistency regarding 
whether Rakes asked if Boyfriend would jump start “his” car or “our” car). The 
defense also put on witnesses and elicited testimony seeking to demonstrate that 
Boyfriend’s story changed over time. E.g. R.816-17 (officer testifying that 
Boyfriend never mentioned anything about a second man who flashed a gun). 
Additionally, the jury heard evidence that Boyfriend was a felon who illegally 
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possessed drugs and weapons. R.568-70, 586, 737-38. 
 Furthermore, the jury heard evidence that Boyfriend had a motive to slant 
his testimony in favor of the State given the beneficial plea deal he worked out 
with the prosecutor. R.569-70. Boyfriend also had a motive to lie about Eyre (and 
Rakes) having a gun. Indeed, Boyfriend indisputably shot Rakes. R.562-63, 583-
84, 641-42, 657. Accordingly, Boyfriend had a motive to exaggerate the nature of 
the threat—including lying about Eyre having a gun—in order to support his 
claim that the shooting was justified. 
 The jury also heard compelling evidence that undermined Boyfriend’s 
claim that Eyre flashed a weapon. Notably, Girlfriend did not observe Eyre flash a 
gun or leave the trunk area of the PT Cruiser. R.655-57. In fact, Girlfriend 
testified that she believed Eyre did nothing to further the crime. R.663. In 
addition to Girlfriend’s testimony, the jury heard evidence suggesting that Eyre 
shielded himself as he fled from the scene, which undercut Boyfriend’s claim that 
Eyre was armed. R.805-06. Also, no weapon was recovered from Eyre. R.725-26.  
Finally, the prosecutor encouraged the jury to convict based upon the 
jumper cable theory and Eyre’s interview alone. See R.868 (prosecutor telling 
jury that they did not “have to decide th[e] case on [the testimony of] [Boyfriend] 
or [Girlfriend], [they] c[ould] decide this case simply on the defendant's own 
words”). Under these circumstances, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
rejected the pistol-flashing theory and convicted based upon the jumper cable 
theory—the theory that was most susceptible to the instructional error.  
30 
 
 In short, counsel’s deficient performance undermines confidence in the 
verdict, and this Court should reverse. 
II. The jury’s improper viewing of Eyre’s videotaped interview 
during deliberations warrants a new trial. 
The trial court improperly denied Eyre a mistrial after the jury was allowed 
to replay his videotaped police interview during deliberations. While the trial 
court correctly recognized that it was improper for the jury to view the interview, 
see infra Part II.A, it erred in determining that this error was harmless. See infra 
Part II.B. Moreover, this issue is preserved, but if not, the issue may be reviewed 
for ineffective assistance. See infra Part II.C. No matter how the issue is 
reviewed, the error warrants a new trial. 
A. It was improper to allow the jury to view Eyre’s videotaped police 
interview during deliberations. 
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that during 
deliberations, “the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all 
exhibits which have been received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in 
the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury . . . .” Utah R. Crim. P. 
17(k). Although the rule “permits the jury to take most exhibits into the 
deliberations,” State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶35, the trial court in this case 
correctly determined that the “jury’s viewing of Exhibit 11 in the jury room during 
deliberations was improper.” R.259.  
The trial court’s position is well-supported by Utah law. Utah appellate 
courts have stated that “‘exhibits which are testimonial in nature should not be 
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given to the jury during its deliberations.’” Id. The rationale for this rule is that 
testimonial writings and recordings are “simply a different form of testimony that 
‘should not be unduly emphasized over oral testimony.’” Id. ¶36 (quoting 
2 McCormick on Evidence § 220 (7th ed. 2016)). 
This Court recently reaffirmed these principals in Cruz, which held that it 
was error to allow the viewing of a child victim’s videotaped police interview 
during deliberations. Id. ¶¶36-41. In reaching its conclusion, this Court reasoned 
that the “video recording [of the child’s interview] pose[d] the same danger of 
undue emphasis as would the transcript of the witness's live trial testimony.” Id. 
¶39. Indeed, the “‘replay of a video recording is tantamount to having the witness 
testify a second time.’” Id. This Court therefore concluded that the child’s 
interview, which “was taken by police for the purpose of prosecuting crime,” 
“f[ell] within the category of ‘exhibits which are testimonial in nature’” and thus 
“should not be given to the jury during its deliberations.” Id. ¶38. 
Likewise here, Eyre’s videotaped interview (Exhibit 11) was testimonial, 
and it was improper to allow it to go into the jury room. As in Cruz, Exhibit 11 
was a recording of an “interview” with the police. Id. ¶¶37-41; see also People v. 
Jefferson, 411 P.3d 823, 826 (Colo. App. 2014) (“a trial court must ‘oversee with 
caution’ the jury's use of exhibits of a testimonial character, including video 
recorded interviews of witnesses”). The interview was also “taken by police for 
the purpose of prosecuting crime.” Id. ¶38. Additionally, Eyre’s interview was 
“video record[ed],” posing a danger of undue emphasis upon it. Id. ¶38. For these 
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reasons, Exhibit 11 constituted a testimonial exhibit that should not have been 
available in the jury room. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that it 
was improper to allow the jury to view Exhibit 11 during deliberations. See R.259. 
B. The jury’s viewing of Exhibit 11 in the jury room was prejudicial. 
The trial court nevertheless erred in determining that the error was 
harmless, and thus, a mistrial was not warranted. See R.259.  “‘[A]n incident rises 
to the level requiring a mistrial’ if the trial court determines that the ‘incident 
may have or probably influenced the jury, to the prejudice of [the defendant].’” 
State v. Craft, 2017 UT App 87, ¶24 (alterations in original). An error is 
prejudicial when there is a “‘reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings.’” Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶42.  
In this case, it is reasonably likely that the jury’s improper review of Exhibit 
11 affected the outcome of Eyre’s trial. Because of the error, the jury had the 
opportunity to replay the recording during deliberations, creating the “danger of 
undue emphasis” on Eyre’s testimony. Id. ¶39. 
The trial court disagreed, concluding that the error was harmless. R.257-
60. In support, the court explained that Eyre would have benefited from any 
undue weight placed on the recording; that the jury’s opportunity to review the 
video was “limited;” and that the State’s evidence was otherwise “sufficient” for 
the jury to convict. R.259-60. The trial court was incorrect because the jury’s 
viewing of Exhibit 11 was prejudicial. 
First, it is reasonably likely that the replaying of Exhibit 11 emphasized 
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Eyre’s statements to his detriment. Although Eyre’s interview contained 
statements that benefited the defense, it also showed Eyre giving three different 
versions of the incident. See State’s Ex. 11. This could have caused the jury to 
question Eyre’s credibility. And credibility was important in this case. On the one 
hand, Boyfriend testified that Eyre aided the robbery by flashing a pistol, R.558-
61, and on the other hand, Eyre stated that he did no such thing. R.760, 768; 
State’s Ex. 11 (11:55-12:35). In deciding who to believe, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the unduly emphasized inconsistencies in Eyre’s interview tipped 
the jury in favor of Boyfriend. Meanwhile, Boyfriend’s credibility problems (of 
which there were plenty, see supra pp. 28-29) were allowed to “fade[] from the 
memory of the jurors.’” Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶36.  
Also, the various witnesses’ “inconsistencies” and “different stories” was 
something capitalized on by both the prosecution and the defense. R.854, 864-
65. In closing, the defense pointed to Boyfriend’s “massive inconsistencies.” 
R.854, 861. And the prosecutor made a point of emphasizing Eyre’s “three 
different stories.” R.864-65. Replaying Eyre’s interview allowed the jury to 
double-check and confirm what the prosecutor was saying. But to confirm the 
defense’s arguments, the jury had to rely on their imperfect memories. Thus, 
replaying the video gave the State an advantage.  
Additionally it appears that Eyre’s entire 23 minute and 27 second police 
interview—which included material that was not played in court—went back into 
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the jury room during deliberations. See State’s Ex. 11, R.870-71, 880-81.6 The 
footage that had not been played for the jury appeared in the last 5 minutes and 
42 seconds of Exhibit 11 (approximately). See R.751-72; State’s Ex. 11. This 
footage contained prejudicial content.  
Among the prejudicial material, was a video recording of police 
handcuffing Eyre.  See State’s Ex. 11 (22:17-23:17). The presence of physical 
restraints not only undermines the presumption of innocence, but tends “to 
prejudice the jury against the accused.” Lucas v. State, 791 S.W.2d 35, 55-56 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970). Moreover, the 
sight of Eyre in handcuffs suggested to the jury that Eyre was a dangerous person 
who was not be trusted. See id. Also among the prejudicial content was footage of 
the detective expressing his opinion that Eyre “w[ould] probably go to jail for 
robbery.” State’s Ex. 11 (18:03-10). Like the handcuffing footage, this portion of 
the video suggested that Eyre’s guilt had already been decided. See id. Indeed, the 
detective’s opinion, much like the opinion of a prosecutor, “carrie[d] with it the 
imprimatur of the Government and may [have] induce[d] the jury to trust the 
Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.” United States 
                                                 
6 At one point, the prosecutor notes that “[d]efense counsel helped [him] 
make it so the jury could not access anything that was extraneous.” R.914-15. In 
making this statement, it appears that the prosecutor was referring to the parties’ 
efforts  to ensure that there was nothing on the computer (with which the jury 
viewed Exhibit 11) “that could contaminate the deliberation process, such as data, 
documents or other items from [Eyre’s] case or any other.” R.249. In other 
words, it does not appear that Exhibit 11 was edited to exclude the content that 
was not played for the jury in open court. 
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v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18 (1985).  
Furthermore, it is reasonably likely that the jury viewed the 5 minutes and 
42 second of additional content. The jury had the ability to access Exhibit 11 for 
20 minutes, and when the video was stopped, it appeared that the jury had seven 
more minutes to watch. R.259, 873-74, 880. Twenty minutes was more than 
enough time for the jury to review the recording, particularly if it skipped around 
or fast-forwarded portions of the video. In short, the accessibility of Exhibit 11 
during deliberations likely exposed the jury to prejudicial content and resulted in 
detrimental emphasis on Eyre’s interview. Thus, the trial court was wrong to 
suggest that the jury’s access to Exhibit 11 was beneficial to Eyre. R.259. 
Second, contrary to the trial court’s suggestion, prejudice resulted even if 
the jury only had access to the video for twenty minutes. R.259-60. As noted, 
twenty minutes was plenty of time for the jury to view and perhaps replay 
segments of Exhibit 11. See State’s Ex. 11. And even if the jury only viewed the 
video once, that is one more time than all the other testimonial evidence was 
reviewed. In other words, even a single replay was “‘tantamount to having [Eyre] 
testify a second time.’” Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶35. Moreover, the mid-
deliberation viewing of Exhibit 11 left Eyre’s interview freshest in the minds of the 
jurors, causing it to stand out. See R.874. Under these circumstances, it is likely 
that the jury afforded undue weight to Eyre’s testimony. 
Third, the trial court incorrectly determined there was no prejudice 
because “[the State] presented sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s 
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verdict without needing to rely on the testimony contained in Exhibit 11.” R.259. 
But a correct prejudice analysis does not focus on whether that State’s evidence 
was “sufficient” or look at the evidence in a light most favorable the verdict. See 
Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶¶30-31. Instead, the analysis looks at errors “in light of the 
‘totality of the evidence,’ ... not just the evidence supporting the verdict.” Id. ¶31. 
This is because “a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is 
more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record 
support.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. Thus, to the extent that the trial court 
denied Eyre’s mistrial motion because the State presented “sufficient evidence,” 
that was a mistake of law to which this Court owes little deference. See Carbaugh 
v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., 2007 UT 65, ¶7, 167 P.3d 1063.   
In any event, as discussed above, evidence of Eyre’s guilt was far from 
overwhelming. See supra pp. 26-29. For instance, Girlfriend did not observe Eyre 
flash a gun and testified that Eyre did nothing to further the crime. See 652-59, 
663. Moreover, no gun was recovered from Eyre’s person. R.725-26.  
Finally, the record suggests that the jury’s viewing of Exhibit 11 influenced 
the verdict. The jury found Exhibit 11 important enough to request and review. 
R.873-74. And as trial counsel noted, the jury had been “deliberating for some 
time” prior to viewing the video, indicating “confusion or discussion about what 
[Eyre] may have said.” R.913-14; see also R.223. It was after reviewing Eyre’s 
interview that the jury came back with a verdict a “short[]” time later. Id. Thus, 
replaying Exhibit 11 appeared to resolve the jury’s questions in favor of guilt. 
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For these reasons, there is a reasonable likelihood that but for the jury’s 
viewing of Exhibit 11, Eyre would have enjoyed a more favorable outcome. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in determining that the error was harmless and 
that a mistrial was not warranted. 
C. Preservation. 
This issue was preserved because the trial court had the opportunity to 
rule—and did in fact rule—on the issue. See Fort Pierce Indus. Park v. 
Shakespeare, 2016 UT 28, ¶13, 379 P.3d 1218 (determining that an issue was 
preserved where the “court not only had an opportunity to rule on the issue … but 
in fact did rule on it”); Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶12, 266 P.3d 828 
(“An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been ‘presented to the district court 
in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it].’”); see also R.240-
45 (Eyre’s memorandum in support of mistrial); 248-54 (State’s memorandum in 
opposition); 257-62 (ruling); 872-82 (discussion, argument, and motion for 
mistrial); 912-15 (additional argument and ruling). 
Nevertheless, Eyre argues in an abundance of caution that the issue may 
also be reviewed for ineffective assistance of counsel. As explained above, a claim 
of ineffective assistance requires “a defendant [to] show (1) that counsel’s 
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel’s deficient performance there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.’” 
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶23, 84 P.3d 1183; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
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First, if this Court believes that trial counsel did anything to limit the 
Court’s consideration of the issue—including failing to take the necessary steps to 
ensure that Exhibit 11 stayed out of the jury room—counsel’s failure constituted 
deficient performance. Under the facts of this case, counsel’s omissions were not 
reasonable or strategic. See State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ¶28 (holding that 
“under the facts of th[e] case,” counsel’s “strategy d[id] not qualify as ‘reasonable’ 
or ‘sound’”). It is evident from the record that counsel did not want the jury to 
view Exhibit 11 during deliberations. See R.872-75; see also R.240-45, 913-14. 
Indeed, upon learning that the jury had access to Exhibit 11 in the jury room, trial 
counsel immediately notified court staff and moved for a mistrial. R.873-74. 
Where counsel’s objective was to keep Exhibit 11 out of the jury room, it was not 
reasonable to render performance that undermined this very goal. Moreover, trial 
counsel himself suggested that misunderstanding and oversight were the only 
reasons he allowed Exhibit 11 to go back into the jury room.  See R.872-74. On 
this record, there is no “‘conceivable tactical basis’” for allowing the jury to 
consider Exhibit 11 during deliberations. State v. Lewis, 2014 UT App 241, ¶10, 
337 P.3d 1053. Thus, counsel’s performance “‘failed to meet an objective standard 
of reasonableness.’” Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶24. 
Second, as set for in Part II.B, supra, it is reasonably likely that Eyre would 
have enjoyed a more favorable outcome but for the jury’s viewing of Exhibit 11. 
For instance, replaying Exhibit 11 unduly emphasized Eyre’s police interview, 
including its inconsistencies. See supra pp. 32-33. The emphasis was particularly 
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prejudicial in a case where credibility was important, and the oral testimony of 
the State’s witnesses suffered from serious credibility problems—problems that 
were allowed to “fade[] from the memory of the jurors.’”  Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, 
¶36; see also supra pp. 28-29, 32-33. In short, reversal is warranted because 
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Eyre.  
III. Cumulative Error Requires Reversal.
The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal when multiple errors
considered collectively “undermine confidence in the fairness of a trial.” State v. 
Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶97, 322 P.3d 624. Even if none of the errors discussed in 
Parts I and II are prejudicial on their own, taken together, they undermine 
confidence in the fairness of Eyre’s trial. 
As explained above, there was a basis in the evidence to acquit on a theory 
that Eyre—in looking for the jumper cables—did not intend to cause aggravated 
robbery. Both errors increased the likelihood that the jury rejected this theory. 
The incorrect jury instructions allowed the jury to ignore this theory of 
acquittal even if they believed that Eyre acted with a purpose other than the 
intent to cause aggravated robbery. See supra Part I. Meanwhile, the replaying of 
Eyre’s interview in the jury room overemphasized Eyre’s testimony and any 
inconsistencies with it. See supra Part II. As a result, there was an increased 
likelihood that the jury did not credit Eyre’s statements—including the 
statements that supported Eyre’s lack of intent. See supra pp. 32-33; see also, 
e.g., R.765. (Eyre stating in his interview that he warned Rakes that the crime
was "a bad ass idea"). Together, the errors worked to close the door on otherwise 
viable theory of acquittal. Thus, the cumulative effect of the errors undermines 
confidence that Eyre had a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, Eyre asks this Court to reverse his 
aggravated robbery conviction and remand for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this J_Jfh day of July 2018. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 > 
1]he defendant, Matthew Gordon Eyre, is charged with the offense of Aggravated Robbery 
i 
which isl alleged to have occurred on August 28, 2016 in Salt Lake County. You cannot convict 
I 




That the defendant, Matthew Gordon Eyre, 
As a party to the offense did 
(a) unlawfully and intentionally take or attempted to take, 
(b) personal property in the possession of another, 
( c) from his person or immediate presence, 
( d) against his will by means of force or fear, 
( e) with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the 
personal property; and 
3 And that in the course of committing these acts a party: 
(a) used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon; or 
, (b) took or attempted to take an operable motor vehicle. 
jfter you carefully consider of all of the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that 
each an1 every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant GUILTY of Aggravated Robbery. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that all 
of the el~ents have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GciILTY of Aggravated Robbery. 
00223
INSTRUCTION NO. 3b 
i person acts "intentionally'' when his conscious objective is to cause a certain result. 
e term "unlawful" or "unlawfully" means contrary to law or without legal justification. 
00226
INSTRUCTION NO. ~, ---
very person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of the offense who 
directly rmmits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another 1erson to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party forl such conduct. 
00227
INSTRUCTION NO. ~0 
1 person can commit a crime as a ''party." In other words, a person can commit a 
criminal !offense even though that person did not personally do all of the acts that make up the 
offense. rf you find beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(1) the defendant intentionally, 
! 
(2) solic· ed, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided another to commit the 
(3) the o ense was committed, 
then you can find the defendant guilty of that offense. 
00228
INSTRUCTION NO. 11.__ 
rior knowledge that a crime is about to be committed or is being committed does not 
make a erson an accomplice, and thereby does not subject them to criminal prosecution unless 
that perl.n has the mental state required to commit the crime and he solicits, requests, 
commaTs, encourages, or intentionally aids in the perpetration of the crime. 
lurther, his mere presence at the crime scene does not in itself subject him to criminal 
prosecu,on for any crime, unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt he possessed the mental 
state reqhired to commit the crime and he acted in such a manner that he solicited, requested, 
comma ed, encouraged, or intentionally aided in the perpetration of the crime. 
I , on the other hand, you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant possessed 
the menrl state required to commit the crime or whether he solicited, requested, commanded, 
encourard, or intentionally aided in the perpetration of the crime(s), you must find him not 
guilty o the charge. 
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 Matthew Eyre, by and through counsel Rudy J. Bautista, respectfully submits this 
Memorandum in support of his Motion for Mistrial 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 Mr. Eyre was charged with Count 1 – Aggravated Robbery, a first-degree felony. See 
Information, dated September 9, 2016. A jury trial was held on October 17 and 18, 2017. On the 
second date of trial, October 18, State’s Exhibit 11 was offered and accepted into evidence, and 
published to the jury. State’s exhibit 11 was a videotaped police interview of Mr. Eyre. 
 Sometime during jury deliberations, defense counsel learned that State’s Exhibit 11 was 
viewed by the jury during deliberation in the jury room. Defense counsel made a motion for 




was to be published and viewed by the jury during deliberations. The Court made this minute 
entry regarding the issue:  
4:24 Court finds that State's exhibit 11, video interview, was published to the jury 
on the record and that a decision for mistrial cannot be made at this time. Motion 
for mistrial is taken under advisement. Court is in recess. 
 
See Minute Entry, dated 10-18-17. Mr. Eyre was later found guilty by the jury of Count 1. 
 
ARGUMENT 
 The jury’s viewing of Mr. Eyre’s videotaped law enforcement interview during 
deliberations, without the knowledge of this Court, constitutes “legal necessity” to warrant a 
mistrial. 
 A defendant can be retried after declaration of a mistrial if “(1) the defendant consents to 
the discharge of the jury, or (2) ‘legal necessity’ requires the discharge in the interest of justice.” 
State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 24, 104 P.3d 1250 (additional citations omitted). Utah's “legal 
necessity” doctrine prohibits a trial court from declaring a mistrial “except in those exceptional 
circumstances where there is a compelling justification for doing so. Id. at ¶ 26. A trial court 
“must refrain from prematurely discharging the jury unless it determines, after careful inquiry, 
that discharging the jury is the only reasonable alternative to insure justice under the 
circumstances.” Id.  
This inquiry requires two steps. “First, a trial court must carefully evaluate all of the 
circumstances and conclude that legal necessity mandates the discharge of the jury. This requires 
the trial judge to afford the parties adequate opportunity to object to the declaration of a 
mistrial.” Id. at ¶ 28. “It also requires the trial judge to consider possible curative alternatives to 
terminating the proceeding and to determine that none of the proposed alternatives are 




both the factual basis for the trial judge's conclusion that a mistrial was necessary and the reasons 
why the alternatives presented by either party were unreasonable under the circumstances.” Id. at 
¶ 28. 
 In the unique circumstances of this case, “legal necessity” exists to justify a mistrial. 
“Although the video recording of a defendant's statement or a victim’s statement is admissible 
evidence, playbacks of such testimony have the capacity to permit a jury to place undue 
emphasis on a single item of evidence.” State v. A.R., 65 A.3d 818, 820 (N.J. 2013). “An audio 
recording permits the jury to hear every inflection, every hesitation, and every equivocation in 
the voice of the witness. A video recording magnifies the effect of a playback of testimony.” Id. 
Indeed, “[v]ideotape testimony is unique. It enables the jury to observe the demeanor and to hear 
the testimony of the witness. It serves as the functional equivalent of a live witness.” United 
States v. Binder, 769 F2d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1985) (replay of videotaped witnesses’ testimony in 
jury deliberations was erroneous). In fact, “[r]epeated jury review of a video-recorded statement 
is tantamount to a second, third, or even fourth appearance of the same witness at trial.” A.R., 65 
A.3d at 820.  
 “It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether to allow a jury to 
review properly admitted testimony or recordings during deliberations.” United States v. 
Muhlenbruch, 634 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2011). Despite giving the trial court the discretion to allow 
replay of videotaped testimony, some states, such as New Jersey, have gone further and 
mandated that “a video-recorded statement must be replayed in open court under the direct 
supervision of the judge. A.R., 65 A.3d at 821 (“Therefore, when confronted with a request to 
replay audio- or video-recorded statements of witnesses or a defendant marked as a trial exhibit 




v. Burr, 948 A.2d 627 (N.J. 2008) (victim’s pre-trial interview admitted into evidence was 
properly replayed at the jury’s request in open court); State v. Miller, 13 A.3d 873 (N.J. 2011) 
 Unlike situations where videotaped statements are replayed for the jury on the record in 
open court, in this case, Mr. Eyre’s police interview was published to the jury and the jury 
viewed the videotaped statements without this Court’s knowledge during deliberations. This 
Court was not able to decide whether to allow the jury to view the police interview in open court 
on the record, because the jury viewed the videotape in deliberations, without the knowledge of 
this Court. This accident qualifies as an “exceptional circumstance” for which there is a 
“compelling justification” for declaring a mistrial. Harris, 2004 UT at ¶ 26. 
 Because this Court was unaware that the jury watched Mr. Eyre’s police interview during 
deliberations, this Court was unable to issue a limiting or curative instruction regarding the 
videotaped evidence, or to decide whether fairness required Mr. Eyre’s live testimony to be read 
to the jury. Thus, this Court has no ability to consider possible curative alternatives to mistrial. 
Id. at ¶ 27. In this case, declaring a mistrial is the only reasonable alternative under the 
circumstances because re-playing Mr. Eyre’s police interview permitted the jury “to place undue 
emphasis on a single item of evidence” – the State’s most persuasive evidence against Mr. Eyre. 
A.R., 65 A.3d at 820.  
CONCLUSION 
 Unlike other situations where properly admitted videotape evidence can be replayed to 
the jury with blessing and knowledge of the trial court, Mr. Eyre’s police interview was replayed 
to the jury during deliberations, without the knowledge of this Court. This unfortunate accident is 
such an “exceptional circumstance” where there is no other reasonable alternative but to declare 




 DATED this 29th day of October, 2017. 
 
            /s/ Rudy J. Bautista    
      Rudy J. Bautista 
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 The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, SIM GILL, Salt Lake County District 
Attorney, and BYRON F. BURMESTER, Deputy District Attorney, hereby submits the State’s 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Mistrial.  
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
After a two day jury trial on October 17 and 18, 2017, the Defendant was found guilty of 
Aggravated Robbery. Exhibit 11, a video of the Defendant speaking with the police, was offered 
and accepted into evidence, and published to the jury along with several other videos.1 The 
defense stipulated to the admission of all exhibits. During jury deliberations, the jury requested a 
                                                 




computer with which to view video exhibits. Defense counsel and the State worked together to 
make sure that there was nothing on the computer desktop that could contaminate the 
deliberation process, such as data, documents or other items from this case or any other. About 
20 minutes after the bailiff took the computer defense counsel asked whether exhibit 11 had gone 
back to the jury. Moments later the bailiff returned with the computer. Defense counsel then 
made a motion for a mistrial. The Court took the motion under advisement and has ordered 
briefing on motion for mistrial. The defense motion was filed on October 29, 2017. First, the 
State opposes the defense’s motion for mistrial since they waived their objection to the video 
being viewed by the jury when they stipulated to the video being admitted into evidence. Second, 
in the alternative, the playing of the video during jury deliberations does not justify a mistrial.  
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO THE EVIDENCE 
BEING VIEWED BY THE JURY WHEN HE STIPULATED TO THE 
ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. 
 
Under Rule 103, a party can claim an error in admitting evidence if the error affects a 
substantial right and the party timely objects while stating a specific ground for the objection. 
Utah R. Evid. Rule 103. In other words, to complain about the admission of evidence there must 
be a clear and definite objection stating the grounds for the objection. See Stagmeyer v. Leatham 
Bros., 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). Further, even if the evidence is admitted in error, a 
verdict should only be set aside is a substantial right of the party is affected. State v. Speer, 750 
P.2d 186, 189 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1988); see also State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 500 (Utah 1986). To 
determine this, the court looks at the evidence as a whole and determines if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that a different result would have been reached. Id.  Additionally, Under Rule 17, 




exhibits which have been received as evidence. . .” Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 17 (emphasis added). 
Further, “[t]he court shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request.” Id.  
In this case, defense counsel waived any objection to the jury’s viewing of exhibit 11 when 
he stipulated to allowing the exhibit into evidence. As noted by Rule 17, the jury can view 
exhibits that are admitted into evidence. Further, the defense did not object until several minutes 
after the jury requested to view the exhibit. In addition, even if the defense did not waive their 
objection to the jury viewing exhibit 11 there is not a reasonable likelihood a different result 
would have been reached if the jury had not viewed exhibit 11 during their deliberations.  
In State v. Dibello, the defense did not object to the admission of several gruesome 
photographs that were viewed by the jury.  780 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1989). One of the 
photos showed the victim’s “. . .body slumped on the sofa and [a] gaping wound where her throat 
was slashed.” Id. at 1231. The Court determined that, even though the photo would have been 
excluded under Rule 403, since the defense failed to object his objection to the admission of the 
evidence was undermined. Id. The Court also held, while the photo was improperly introduced, 
that there is not a reasonable likelihood that the defendant would have achieved a more favorable 
result without the admission of the evidence. Id. 
Similarly, in this case, the defense also failed to timely object to the admission of the 
evidence. Like in Dibello, the failure of the defense to timely object to the admission of the 
evidence undermines their attempt to obtain a mistrial after the jury had begun their 
deliberations. Further, if the court in Dibello found that the admission of a gruesome photograph 
of the victim’s throat slashed wouldn’t have led to a different outcome, the admission of a video 
of the Defendant speaking with police is not so unfair that it would have changed the outcome in 




in chief. Allowing the jury to review exhibit 11, for no more than twenty minutes, does not create 
a reasonable likelihood that this changed the outcome, especially when the other evidence that 
was presented at trial is considered. Unlike the gruesome photograph in Dibello that would have 
been excluded under Rule 403, there is no evidence that exhibit 11 in this case contained 
evidence that was so prejudicial that it would have changed the outcome of the trial.  
 Therefore, by failing to object to the admission of the evidence, the defense waived their 
objection to the evidence being viewed by the jury during their deliberations.  
II. EVEN IF THE DEFENSE DID NOT WAIVE THEIR OBJECTION TO THE 
ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE, THE JURY’S VIEWING OF THE 
EXHBIT DURING THEIR DELIBERATIONS DOES NOT WARRANT A 
MISTRIAL.  
  
The defense claims in their motion that the jury viewing a properly admitted exhibit, an 
exhibit that was stipulated to being admitted by the defense, constitutes a “legal necessity” that 
requires this Court to dismiss the jury’s guilty verdict and grant a mistrial. To grant a mistrial 
based on a legal necessity, the trial court must find that there are “exceptional circumstances” 
and that there is a “compelling justification” for granting a mistrial. See State v. Harris, 2004 UT 
103, ¶¶ 24-25. The State contends that there are not exceptional circumstances or compelling 
justifications in this case that would warrant a mistrial.  
First, as noted in the defense’s motion, the trial court has discretion to determine whether to 
allow the jury to review admitted testimony or recordings during their deliberations. See United 
States v. Muhlenbruch, 634 F.3d 987 (8th  Cir. 2011).  However, in support of their claim, the 
defense cites to a case from New Jersey, where the court determined that the jury playing video 
testimony during deliberations placed undue emphasis on a single item of evidence. See State v. 




recording for the jury is within the discretion of the trial judge. See id. at 826. In that case 
involving child sexual abuse, two video statements -- one was of the child victim and one was of 
the defendant -- were admitted into evidence. Id. at 824. The new Jersey Supreme Court 
expressed concerns that the nature of the video and the jury’ unencumbered access to the video 
recording may have undermined the fairness of the trial. See id. at 826-827. However, the Court 
ultimately upheld the conviction under the invited error doctrine since the defense did not object 
to the viewing of the video and, in fact, encouraged the jury to view the video. Id. at 831. 
Unlike in A.R., this case only involves a video of the defendant, and not the victim, being 
viewed during deliberations. In A.R., the victim’s video recording dealt with a nine year old girl 
graphically describing how her uncle sexually assaulted by her. Id. at 821. In finding error with 
the jury viewing of the video during deliberations, the Court in A.R. noted that they were 
concerned due to that nature of the video. Id. at 827.  In this case, there are no such concerns. 
Rather than an underage victim graphically describing sexual assault, the video in this case deals 
with the defendant talking with police about an aggravated robbery. In addition, the concerns 
regarding undue emphasis on a particular witness’s testimony doesn’t apply in this case. The 
witness who testified at trial was the officer who conducted the interview with the Defendant. 
The Defendant was not even a witness in the case. Therefore, the concerns over hearing a 
witness testify multiple times are misapplied in this case. 
 Further, in State v. Cruz, the Court recognized the holding in A.R. with respect to victim 
interviews being played during deliberations. 2016 UT App 234 ¶ 39. Like in A.R., the jury 
viewed a CJC interview of a child sexual abuse victim. See id. at ¶¶ 3-6. The video contained a 
six year old victim describing how she performed oral sex on the defendant. Id. at ¶ 6. While 




Court held that the video in that case was testimonial and that it had a danger of placing undue 
influence on the witness’s testimony. Id. at ¶¶ 39-40. Unlike in Cruz, the video in this case does 
not involve a victim who is acting as a witness. Rather, the video contains the Defendant’s own 
statements that he made to the police. In addition, the video in this case does not contain the 
same inflammatory evidence as that of a young childr graphically describing sexual abuse.  
 Lastly, even the Court in Cruz, like in A.R., ultimately did not reverse the outcome at 
trial. In fact, the Court held, despite the error, that Cruz could not show a reasonable likelihood 
that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at ¶ 49. Similarly, in this case, even if the 
Court finds error in the jury’s viewing of exhibit 11 during their deliberations, there is not a 
reasonable likelihood that this error changed the outcome of the trial. Considering the other 
evidence at trial and the fact that the jury viewed the video earlier, it is unlikely that, had the jury 
not viewed the video again, for a maximum of twenty minutes, that they would have changed 
their verdict. Therefore, a mistrial is not warranted in this case and the jury’s guilty verdict 
should stand.  
CONCLUSION  
 
For the foregoing reasons, the State requests that the Court deny the Defendant’s motion 
for a mistrial.  
    /s/ Byron F. Burmester 
______________________________________ 
          BYRON F. BURMESTER 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH ------o~e..;;;;pu:1..fy_C_le_rk 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW GORDON EYRE, 
Defendant. 
RULING & ORDER 
Civil No. 161909443 
Judge Royal I. Hansen 
Pending before the Court is Defendant Matthew Gordon Eyre's ("Defendant") Motion for 
Mistrial (the "Motion"). Defendant filed the Motion with an accompanying memorandum on or 
about October 29, 2017. Plaintiff the State of Utah ("Plaintiff') filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motion on or about November 7, 2017. Defendant has filed no Reply 
Memorandum in Support of the Motion and the time to do so has now expired. Neither party has 
requested oral argument with regard to the Motion. The Motion is therefore fully briefed and 
ready for decision. 
DISCUSSION 
A mistrial is permitted only if "legal necessity requires the discharge [ of the jury] in the 
interest of justice." State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, if24, 104 P.3d 1250. The legal necessity 
doctrine "prohibits a trial court from declaring a mistrial except in those exceptional 
circumstances where there is a compelling justification for doing so." Id. at if25. "[L]egal 
necessity is established only if a mistrial is the only reasonable alternative to insure justice under 
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the circumstances." State v. Manatau, 2014 UT 7, ,110, 322 P.3d 739. In order to show that a 
mistrial is the only reasonable alternative, the following two elements must be met: 
Id. at ,r,r10, 13. 
[fJirst, the trial judge has a duty to carefully evaluate the 
circumstances of the particular case and determine that legal 
necessity requires the discharge of the jury. As part of the inquiry, 
the judge ... must consider possible alternatives to terminating the 
proceeding and determine that none of the proposed alternatives 
are reasonable .... Second, the trial court must establish a record 
of the factual basis for its conclusion that a mistrial is necessary, as 
well as the reasons why there is no reasonable alternative under the 
circumstances. 
In the Motion, Defendant argues that the jury's viewing of Exhibit 11-a video of 
Defendant speaking with the police-in the jury room during deliberations requires the 
declaration of a mistrial in this case. In support of this argument, Defendant relies on State v. 
A.R., a New Jersey case. In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that "unfettered 
access to the video-recorded statements of the victim and defendant in the jury room during 
deliberations" was improper. See State v. A.R., 65 A.3d 818, 828 (N.J. 2013). Nevertheless, the 
Court found "the procedure utilized cannot be said to undermine the trial process." Id. 
Moreover, the Court also found that, because defense counsel had encouraged the jury to view 
the video-recorded statements, the invited-error doctrine applied to preclude declaration of a 
mistrial. See id at 830. The Utah Court of Appeals has also addressed the propriety of a jury's 
access to video-recorded statements during the deliberation process in State v. Cruz, 2016 UT 
App 234, 387 P.3d 618. In that case, the Court reasoned "[a] recording of a[n] interview ... 
constitutes ... testimony-or, at the very least, falls within the category of exhibits which are 
testimonial in nature and thus should not be given to the jury during its deliberations." Id. at ,138. 
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Nevertheless, rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides "[a]ny error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded." UTAH R. CRIM. P. 30(a). In examining this provision, courts have clarified 
"[h]armless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable 
likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings." See State v. Devey, 2006 UT App 
219, 119, 138 P.3d 90. "Put differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different 
outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines[] confidence in the verdict." State v. Evans, 
2001 UT 22,120, 20 P.3d 888. 
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes the jury's viewing of Exhibit 11 in the jury room 
during deliberations was improper. Nevertheless, the Court finds that any error in providing 
Exhibit 11 to the jury during deliberations is harmless. Indeed, Plaintiff presented sufficient 
evidence at trial to support the jury's verdict without needing to rely on the testimony contained 
in Exhibit 11. Thus, the likelihood of a different verdict is not sufficiently high that it 
undermines the Court's confidence in the verdict. See id. 
Moreover, unlike the video-recordings addressed in bothA.R. and Cruz-both of which 
involved testimony of child victims of sexual abuse-the video-recording in this case involves 
only Defendant's testimony. Thus, there is no concern that the jury might have given undue 
weight to the testimony of a child victim in this case. Indeed, it was Defendant who would have 
benefitted from any undue weight the jury might have placed on such testimony based on 
repeated viewings. 
Finally, the jury was only permitted to access Exhibit 11 in the jury room for 20 minutes 
during deliberations, after which the Court removed Exhibit 11 from those exhibits contained on 
the computer in the jury room. The short time the jury had access to Exhibit 11 in the jury room 
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hardly constitutes the "unfettered access" to a video-recording addressed in both A.R. and Cruz. 1 
Such limited access prevented the jury from repeatedly viewing Defendant's testimony during 
deliberations. Cf Martin v. State, 747 P.2d 316,320 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (holding that "it 
was error for the trial court to submit the video tape of [] testimony to the jury for their 
unrestricted and, very likely, repeated viewing during deliberations"). This inability to 
repeatedly view Defendant's testimony during deliberations further allays concerns that the jury 
might have placed undue weight on such testimony. 
Thus, the Court finds that allowing the jury to view Exhibit 11 in the jury room during 
deliberations constitutes harmless error in that it "d[id] not affect the substantial rights of a 
party." See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 30(a). Consequently, the Court must disregard the foregoing error. 
See id Moreover, as the error was harmless, Defendant has failed to establish a "compelling 
justification" required for the Court to declare a mistrial in this matter. See Harris, 2004 UT 
103, at if25, 104 P.3d 1250. Defendant is therefore not entitled to the relief requested in the 
Motion. See id. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Mistrial. The matter 
will therefore proceed to sentencing, at a hearing scheduled for that purpose on December 8, 
2017 at 8:30 a.m. 
This Ruling and Order is the order of the Court and no further writing is necessary to 
effectuate this decision. 
1 The Court notes both cases involved the provision of video-recorded testimony to the jury for the entirety of the 
deliberation process. 
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So Ordered this ~ay ofNovember, 2017. 
Judge Royal I. Hans 
District Court Judge 
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                                    3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE  
                                   SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH  
        ______________________________________________________________________________________
 
        STATE OF UTAH,                            :  MINUTES                                   
                    Plaintiff,                    :  SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT            
                                                  :  
                                                  :  
        vs.                                       :  Case No: 161909443 FS                     
        MATTHEW GORDON EYRE,                      :  Judge:   ROYAL I HANSEN                   
                    Defendant.                    :  Date:    December 8, 2017                 
        Custody: Salt Lake County Jail                                                         
                                                                                               
        ______________________________________________________________________________________
        PRESENT                                                                                
        Clerk:    danielsf                                                                     
        Prosecutor: BURMESTER, BYRON F                                                         
        Defendant Present                                                                      
        The defendant is in the custody of the Salt Lake County Jail                           
        Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J                                              
                                                                                               
        DEFENDANT INFORMATION                        
        Date of birth: June 10, 1981                                                           
        Sheriff Office#: 307726                                                                
        Audio                                                                                  
        Tape Number:     N44   Tape Count: 1119-1142                                           
                                                                                               
 
        CHARGES                                                                                
        1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
             Plea: Not Guilty  - Disposition: 10/18/2017 Guilty                                
 
 
        HEARING                                                                                
                                                   
     
        Counsel argue the motion for a new trial. Court denies the motion and refers to the 
        written ruling previously issued by the Court.                                         
 
        SENTENCE PRISON                                                                        
        Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st Degree Felony, the 
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: December 08, 2017 At the direction of:









        Case No: 161909443 Date:    Dec 08, 2017
        ______________________________________________________________________________________
 
        defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than ten years and which 
        may be life in the Utah State Prison.                                                  
        
        COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.                                                    
        
        To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff:  The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
        transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.          
 
        
        SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE                                                           
        Court recommends Drug Treatment Program and credit for time served of 468 days.        
 
        ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE                                                               
        PINBALL                                                                                
                                                                                               
 
        Court orders full restitution which is to be left open for the statutory time period.  
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                           CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION                                         
 
        I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for 
        case 161909443 by the method and on the date specified.                                
                                                   
        EMAIL:  ADC ADC-court1@slco.org                                                        
        EMAIL:  ADC TRANSPORT ADC-Transportation@slco.org                                      
        EMAIL:  PRISON udc-records@utah.gov                                                    
                                                   
              12/08/2017                  /s/ DANIEL FARNSWORTH                                
        Date: ____________________         ______________________________                      
                                                     































Utah Code § 76-2-202 




Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense 
who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 











U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-301 
§ 76-6-301. Robbery 
 
 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
  
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the 
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of 
force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of 
the personal property; or 
  
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against 
another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation. 
  
(2) An act is considered to be “in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation“ if 
it occurs: 
  
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation; 
  
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
  
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
  





Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-301; Laws 1995, c. 222, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 2004, c. 112, § 





Utah Code § 76-6-302 
§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be “in the course of 
committing a robbery” if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, 





Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-302; Laws 1975, c. 51, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 7; Laws 1994, c. 
271, § 1; Laws 2003, c. 62, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
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State of Utah, No. 20080408
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
F I L E D
Warren Steed Jeffs,
Defendant and Appellant. July 27, 2010
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Fifth District, St. George
The Honorable James L. Shumate
No. 061500526
Attorneys:  Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Laura Dupaix, Craig L.
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¶1 Defendant Warren Jeffs was convicted of two counts of
rape as an accomplice for his role in the compelled marriage of
fourteen-year-old Elissa Wall to her nineteen-year-old first
cousin, Allen Steed, and the resulting sexual intercourse between
them.  Jeffs appeals his convictions, arguing a variety of errors
in the proceedings before the trial court.  While we are
unconvinced by the majority of Jeffs’ arguments, we conclude that
there were serious errors in the instructions given to the jury
that deprived Jeffs of the fair trial to which all are entitled
under our laws.  We therefore reverse the convictions and remand
for a new trial.
¶2 Recognizing the highly publicized nature of this case,
we remind the parties, the trial court, and observers, that the
presumption of innocence guaranteed to all by our Constitution
demands great care from the courts and those who prosecute on
behalf of the people.  As this state’s court of last resort, we
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are not at liberty to accept less, nor could we, consistent with
our oaths to support, obey, and defend the constitutions of this
state and country.
BACKGROUND
¶3 “On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict.”  State v. Holgate , 2000 UT 74,
¶ 2, 10 P.3d 346 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Conflicting
evidence is presented “only as necessary to understand issues
raised on appeal.”  Id.   We recite the facts of this case
accordingly.
¶4 Elissa Wall was raised as a member of the
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“FLDS
Church”).  As a follower of that religion, she was extensively
exposed to the teachings of the defendant, Warren Jeffs
(“Jeffs”), who is the son of, and the former first counselor to,
then-FLDS leader Rulon Jeffs (“Rulon”).  From the first through
the sixth grade, Wall attended school at Alta Academy, a private
FLDS school where Jeffs acted as a teacher and as the principal.
Outside of school, Wall was further exposed to Jeffs’ teachings
through Sunday meetings, church literature, and recordings that
were broadcast through her home on a speaker system and that she
listened to on a personal cassette player.
¶5 Proper relationships between the sexes figured
prominently in Jeffs’ teachings.  He taught that, prior to
marriage, boys and girls were to treat each other as “snakes,”
avoiding all intermingling or social contact.  Girls were to
relax this standard only with their husbands after marriage. 
However, most FLDS girls, including Wall, received no instruction
about anatomy or reproduction.  Jeffs taught that girls would be
trained in these matters by their husbands.
¶6 Jeffs’ teachings also focused extensively on the
importance of obedience.  As “God on earth,” the FLDS prophet and
his counselors were to be obeyed completely and willingly. 
Failure to do so would result in forfeiture of spiritual
salvation, loss of family and friends, denial of marriage, and
removal from the FLDS community.  In addition to obeying their
church leaders, Jeffs taught that women should obey their
husbands, who were their individual “priesthood heads.”
¶7 Wall witnessed the consequences of failing to follow
these teachings firsthand in 1999 when her father was deemed
disobedient to FLDS leaders and had his family “stripped from
him.”  Wall, her mother, and her siblings were removed from her
father’s home in Salt Lake City and sent to live with Fred
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Jessop, Rulon’s then second counselor, in Hildale, Utah.  Jeffs
subsequently performed a ceremony marrying Wall’s mother to
Jessop as one of his plural wives.
¶8 The doctrine that God will reveal to the FLDS prophet
which of his followers should be joined in marriage relationships
is fundamental to the FLDS faith.  Wall, therefore, expected that
church leaders would arrange her marriage.  But she was shocked
when, in 2001, Jessop told her that the prophet had a “place of
marriage” for her and that she was to prepare herself for that
place.  Wall, who was then only fourteen years old, objected
because of her age, but Jessop again told her that she needed to
prepare herself.  When Wall asked who she was to marry, Jessop
told her that it would be “revealed” to her later.  A few days
before the wedding, Jessop told her she would marry Allen Steed,
her nineteen-year-old first cousin.  Wall told Jessop she would
not marry Steed, but Jessop told her she would have to discuss
the matter with the prophet, Rulon, since it was he who had
arranged the marriage.
¶9 Rulon had recently suffered a debilitating stroke and
Jeffs was managing his affairs.  Wall called Jeffs and arranged a
meeting with Rulon.  Jeffs was present when Wall spoke with
Rulon.  She told Rulon that she did not wish to be disobedient,
but asked him to let her wait until she was at least sixteen to
be married and to place her with someone other than her cousin. 
Rulon told Wall, “Follow your heart, sweetie.  Follow your
heart.”  Wall understood this to mean that she would not have to
marry Steed.  Jeffs, however, told her afterwards, “The prophet
wanted me to remind you that this is the right thing to do.  And
you will go forward with this.”  Later that day, Jessop, despite
Wall’s pleading, confirmed that her wedding to Steed would still
take place.
¶10 Two of Wall’s older sisters, both of whom were married
to Rulon, tried to intervene on Wall’s behalf.  Jeffs was present
during their conversation with Rulon.  Rulon expressed concern
over the arrangements, but Jeffs said that Jessop was “insisting
that this happen because of who he is” and “[w]e would like to
honor his request.”
¶11 Knowing that she would no longer be welcome in Jessop’s
home and that she would have to give up her relationships with
her mother and her siblings if she did not marry Steed, Wall felt
she had no option but to go through with the marriage.  In April
2001, Wall was taken to Caliente, Nevada, for the wedding.  Jeffs
performed the ceremony, throughout which Wall cried tears of
despair and fear.  When Jeffs asked her if she took Steed to be
her husband, she hung her head and said nothing.  Jeffs repeated
No. 20080408 4
the question, and again Wall did not answer.  After a long
silence, Jeffs asked Wall’s mother to stand by Wall and hold her
hand.  Jeffs repeated the question a third time, and Wall’s
mother squeezed her hand.  Finally, Wall answered, “Okay, I do.”
Jeffs told Steed he could kiss the bride, but Wall hung her head
and shook it.  Jeffs commanded, “Lisi, kiss Allen.”  Wall gave
Steed “a peck on the lips,” then dropped his hand.  Jeffs
rejoined Wall’s and Steed’s hands and pronounced, “Now go forth
and multiply and replenish the earth with good priesthood
children.”  Wall then ran from the room and locked herself in a
bathroom.  Although no marriage license had been obtained, Wall
considered herself married to Steed, which made him her leader
and “priesthood head.”
¶12 During the honeymoon trip that followed, Steed began
touching Wall sexually.  Still ignorant of sex, Wall did not
understand why he was touching her and was “terrified” and
“horrified.”  She repeatedly asked Steed to stop, telling him
that she hated him and did not want him to touch her.  Two to
three weeks after the wedding, Steed exposed his genitals to Wall
at a park.  She ran away from him crying and hid in her mother’s
room.  She stayed in her mother’s room until the early hours of
the morning, hoping that Steed would go to sleep.  When she
returned to her own room, however, she found Steed sitting on the
bed.  Over Wall’s extensive protests, Steed began to undress her. 
She broke away and fled back to her mother’s room, where she
stayed for several days.  When Wall eventually returned to her
own room, Steed told her, “It is time for you to be a wife and do
your duty.”  Although Wall cried and begged him not to, Steed
then had sexual intercourse with Wall.  The first of the State’s
two charges against Jeffs is based on this act of intercourse.
¶13 In the late spring of 2001, Wall had another meeting
with Jeffs.  She told Jeffs that Steed was touching her and doing
things that she “was not comfortable with and didn’t fully
understand.”  She begged Jeffs for a “release” from the marriage,
the FLDS equivalent of a divorce.  In response, Jeffs told Wall
that she needed to “repent” and that she was not being “obedient
. . . [and] submissive.”  Instead of releasing her from the
marriage, Jeffs told her that she “needed to go home and give
[her]self to [Steed], who was [her] priesthood head and husband,
mind, body, and soul and obey without any question.”  Within days
of this meeting, Steed again had sexual intercourse with Wall. 
The second of the State’s two charges against Jeffs is based on
this act of intercourse.  The relationship between Wall and Steed
continued through September 2003, with sex sometimes occurring
without Wall’s consent and sometimes with her consent.
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¶14 The State charged Jeffs with two counts of rape as an
accomplice, a first degree felony, under Utah Code sections
76-2-202 and 76-5-402 (2008).  Following a preliminary hearing,
Jeffs was bound over for trial.  A jury convicted him as charged. 
Jeffs moved to arrest judgment, alleging that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions.  The trial court denied
the motion and sentenced Jeffs to two consecutive prison terms of
five years to life.  Jeffs moved for a new trial, arguing that
the court had erred in seating an alternate juror after
deliberations had begun.  The court denied this motion on the
basis of invited error.  This appeal followed.  We have
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(I)
(2008).
ANALYSIS
¶15 Jeffs raises seven issues that he claims invalidate
either the jury verdict or the resulting sentences.  Jeffs argues
that:  (1) the accomplice liability and consent instructions
given to the jury were erroneous, (2) the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury that it must reach a unanimous
decision on whichever of the prosecution’s theories supported its
finding that the victim did not consent, (3) there was
insufficient evidence to sustain Jeffs’ convictions, (4) there
was insufficient evidence that Jeffs enticed Wall into a sexual
relationship with Steed, (5) the “enticement” language of Utah
Code section 76-5-406(11) is unconstitutionally vague, (6) the
trial court erred in denying Jeffs’ motion for a new trial
because the court reconstituted the jury after deliberations had
begun, and (7) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive
sentences.  We agree with Jeffs that the consent instructions
given to the jury were erroneous and warrant a reversal of his
convictions.  Accordingly, we need not reach the remainder of his
claims.  We do address, however, Jeffs’ argument with respect to
the correctness of the jury instruction on accomplice liability
to give guidance to the trial court on remand.
I.  THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON CONSENT AND ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
WERE ERRONEOUS
¶16 Jeffs contends that instructions given to the jury on
the issues of consent and accomplice liability were erroneous. 
Specifically, Jeffs argues that the instruction on consent
erroneously focused the jury on Jeffs’ relationship with Wall
rather than on Steed’s relationship with Wall.  With respect to
the accomplice liability instruction, Jeffs argues that the trial
court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that Jeffs could not
be found guilty as an accomplice to rape unless Jeffs intended
that Steed engage in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with Wall. 
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Claims of erroneous jury instructions present questions of law
that we review for correctness.  State v. Miller , 2008 UT 61,
¶ 13, 193 P.3d 92.  We therefore review the instructions given to
the jury without deference to the trial court.  Before turning to
the actual jury instructions themselves, however, we outline the
law applicable to the State’s charges against Jeffs.
A.  The Charges Against Jeffs
¶17 The State charged Jeffs with two counts of rape as an
accomplice.  The first count was alleged to have occurred shortly
after Wall and Steed were married when they first had
intercourse.  The second count was alleged to have occurred after
Jeffs refused to “release” Wall from her marriage to Steed and
counseled her to “give herself to [Steed], . . . mind, body and
soul.”
¶18 These charges implicate three different sections of the
Utah Code: (1) the rape statute found in section 76-5-402, (2)
the consent statute found in section 76-5-406, and (3) the
accomplice liability statute found in section 76-2-202.  We begin
our discussion with the rape statute.
¶19 “A person commits rape when the actor has sexual
intercourse with another person without the victim’s consent.” 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402(1) (2008).  A rape can be committed
“whether or not the actor is married to the victim.”  Id.  § 76-5-
402(2).
¶20 To establish the required lack of consent, the State
relied on three separate subsections of section 76-5-406, the
statute that defines the circumstances under which an act of
sexual intercourse is deemed to be without the victim’s consent. 
The relevant sections provide:
An act of sexual intercourse . . . is
without consent of the victim under any of
the following circumstances:
(1) the victim expresses lack of consent
through words or conduct;
. . .
(10) the victim is younger than 18 years
of age and at the time of the offense the
actor was the victim’s parent, stepparent,
adoptive parent, or legal guardian or
occupied a position of special trust in
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relation to the victim as defined in
Subsection 76-5-404.1(4)(h);
(11) the victim is 14 years of age or
older, but younger than 18 years of age, and
the actor is more than three years older than
the victim and entices or coerces the victim
to submit or participate . . . .
Id.  §§ 76-5-406(1), (10)-(11).
¶21 Because the sexual intercourse on which the charges
were based was between Wall and Steed, rather than between Wall
and Jeffs, the accomplice liability statute also comes into play. 
It provides:  “Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who directly commits
the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for
such conduct.”  Id.  § 76-2-202.
¶22 Therefore, to convict Jeffs as an accomplice to rape,
the State was required to establish that Jeffs, acting with the
requisite mental intent, solicited, requested, commanded,
encouraged or intentionally aided Steed to have nonconsensual
sexual intercourse with Wall.  We analyze the jury instructions
in light of these statutes to determine whether they accurately
stated the State’s burden.  We begin with the consent instruction
and then turn to the accomplice liability instruction.
B.  The Consent Instruction Was Erroneous
¶23 We first address Jeffs’ claim that the jury instruction
regarding consent was erroneous.  Jeffs argues that the
instruction erroneously focused the jury on Jeffs’ actions and
position of special trust, rather than on Steed’s, for the
purpose of determining whether Wall consented to sexual
intercourse.  We agree that the consent instruction was
erroneous.
¶24 As previously indicated, the State identified three
different sections of the consent statute pursuant to which it
argued that the sexual intercourse between Wall and Steed was
without Wall’s consent.  First, under subsection (1) of the
consent statute, the State argued that Wall showed “express[]
lack of consent through words or conduct.”  Id.  § 76-5-406(1). 
As evidence of this lack of consent, the State relied on Wall’s
pleas to Jeffs not to make her marry Steed, her repeated refusal
during the marriage ceremony to answer “I do,” her reluctance to
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kiss Steed, and her running from the room and locking herself in
the bathroom after the ceremony.  The State additionally argued
that Wall continued to show an express lack of consent after the
ceremony by attempting to avoid physical contact with Steed,
crying, and begging Steed not to have sexual intercourse with
her.
 
¶25 Second, under subsection (10), the State argued that
Wall was under eighteen years of age and that Jeffs  was in a
“position of special trust” in relation to Wall.  Id.
§ 76-5-406(10).  As used in subsection (10), “‘position of
special trust’ means [a] position occupied by a person in a
position of authority, who, by reason of that position is able to
exercise undue influence over the victim, and includes, but is
not limited to, a . . . religious leader . . . .”  Id.
§ 76-5-404.1(4)(h).  At trial, the State argued that Jeffs
occupied a position of special trust in relation to Wall because
he was her religious leader, and as such had near absolute
control over her, her family, and her entire community.  Further,
he used his position as a religious leader to put Wall in a
circumstance where she had no choice but to submit to unwanted
sexual intercourse.
¶26 Third, under subsection (11), the State argued that
Wall was over fourteen years of age but under eighteen years of
age, that Jeffs  was more than three years her senior, and that
Jeffs  used psychological and religious manipulation to entice
Wall to submit to unwanted sexual intercourse.  See id.
§ 76-5-406(11).  To support this theory, the State cited Jeffs’
actions of convincing Wall to enter into the marriage, his
direction during the wedding ceremony that Wall and Steed
“multiply and replenish the earth,”  and his later refusal to
release her from the marriage coupled with his counsel that she
“go home and give [her]self to [Steed] . . . mind, body and
soul.”
¶27 The instruction given to the jury reflected the State’s
three theories.  It stated the following:
An act of sexual intercourse is without
consent of a person under any, all, or a
combination of the following circumstances:
1.  The person expresses lack of consent
through words or conduct; or
2.  The person was 14 years of age or
older, but younger than 18 years of age, and
the actor was more than three years older
than the person and enticed the person to
submit or participate; or
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3.  The person was younger than 18 years
of age and at the time of the offense the
actor occupied a position of special trust in
relation to the person.
¶28 In order to clarify the State’s second and third
theories, the court also gave the following instructions:
In order to find the victim’s lack of
consent because the victim is younger than 18
years of age and at the time of the offense
that the Defendant  occupied a position of
“special trust” in relation to Elis[s]a Wall
you must be convinced that the State has
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
offense was committed by a person who
occupied a position of special trust in
relation to the victim.
. . .
In order to find that Elissa Wall was
enticed the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant  lured or
induced a person to submit to or to
participate in an act of sexual intercourse.
(Emphasis added.)
¶29 Jeffs argues that it was impermissible for the court to
focus the jury on his own position of special trust and on his
own enticing actions in determining whether the intercourse
between Steed and Wall was consensual.  Rather, Jeffs contends
that the jury should have been asked to consider whether Steed
was in a position of special trust and whether Steed  enticed
Wall.  We agree with Jeffs.
¶30 While the jury instruction appears to track the
statutory language, the instruction erroneously interprets the
statute’s use of the term “actor,” as used in Utah Code sections
76-5-406(10) and (11), to refer to the defendant, Jeffs, rather
than to Steed.  Those sections provide that the intercourse will
be deemed to be nonconsensual if “the victim is younger than 18
years of age and at the time of the offense the actor   . . .
occupied a position of special trust in relation to the victim,”
or if “the victim is 14 years of age or older, but younger than
18 years of age, and the actor  is more than three years older
than the victim and entices or coerces the victim to submit or
participate . . . .”  Id.  § 76-5-406(10)-(11) (emphases added). 
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As evidenced by the additional clarifying instruction, the State
interprets the term “actor” to mean the “defendant.”
¶31 We conclude that the State’s interpretation is
erroneous.  In interpreting a statute, we look to its plain
language.  Dale T. Smith & Sons v. Utah Labor Comm’n , 2009 UT 19,
¶ 7, 208 P.3d 533.  We read statutory provisions literally,
unless such a reading “would result in an unreasonable or
inoperable result.”  State v. Jeffries , 2009 UT 57, ¶ 7, 217 P.3d
265.  And “‘we assume the legislature used each term advisedly
and in accordance with its ordinary meaning.’”  Id.  (quoting
State v. Martinez , 2002 UT 80, ¶ 8, 52 P.3d 1276).  “‘[E]ach part
or section should be construed in connection with every other
part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.’”  State v.
Moreno , 2009 UT 15, ¶ 10, 203 P.3d 1000 (quoting Sill v. Hart ,
2007 UT 45, ¶ 7, 162 P.3d 1099).
¶32 “Actor” is defined by statute as “a person whose
criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action.”  Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-601(2).  The person whose criminal
responsibility is at issue in a criminal action will usually be
the defendant.  For example, under the rape statute, “[a] person
commits rape when the actor has sexual intercourse with another
person without the victim’s consent.”  Id.  § 76-5-402(1).  Under
the rape statute, therefore, the “actor” must be the person who
has nonconsensual sexual intercourse with the victim or, in other
words, the defendant who is being prosecuted for an act of rape.
¶33 But section 76-1-601 also provides that its definition
of “actor” does not apply to those statutes that provide
otherwise.  And we conclude that the consent statute provides
otherwise.  The opening words of section 76-5-406 specifically
indicate that the section discusses the “act of sexual
intercourse” and the circumstances under which that act occurs
without consent.  Id.  § 76-5-406.  Because the act at issue is
the act of sexual intercourse, the term “actor” as used in
subsections (10) and (11) must necessarily relate back to the
underlying “act of sexual intercourse.”  And the term “actor”
must refer to the person who engages in the act at issue. 
Therefore, the “actor” is the person who engages in sexual
intercourse.  To read the statute otherwise would require us to
sever the term “actor” from the context of the surrounding
provisions.  Because Jeffs did not engage in sexual intercourse
with Wall, it was erroneous for the jury instructions to equate
the term “actor” with the term “defendant” in instructing the
jury as to whether the State had met its burden of proving that
the sexual intercourse between Steed and Wall was nonconsensual.
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¶34 Our conclusion that the term “actor” refers to the
individual engaging in the act of intercourse is consistent with
the principle that, in order for accomplice liability to arise,
there must be an underlying offense.  Only after there is a
determination that an offense has been committed can the law
impose liability on another party who “solicit[ed], request[ed],
command[ed], encourag[ed], or intentionally aid[ed]” in the
commission of that offense.  Id.  § 76-2-202.  To determine
whether a rape has occurred, section 76-5-406 is applied and a
determination is made of whether there was sexual intercourse
without consent.  The question of accomplice liability cannot
enter the equation until after a determination has been made that
a crime has been committed.  As a result, the use of the term
“actor” under the consent statute can refer only to the person
engaging in the act of intercourse.
¶35 To construe the statute otherwise would lead to absurd
results.  For example, if the term “actor” as used in subsection
(10) of the consent statute is deemed to refer to the defendant
in an accomplice-liability case, a parent who encourages his
pregnant minor daughter to marry the adult father of her unborn
baby would satisfy the requirements of that subsection, thereby
rendering any further intercourse between the couple
nonconsensual and the parent guilty of a first degree felony as
an accomplice to rape.
¶36 In summary, we hold that the term “actor” as used in
subsections (10) and (11) of Utah Code section 76-5-406 refers to
the person who engaged in the act of sexual intercourse.  As a
result, those subsections could not be applied to Jeffs.  Only
Steed’s position of special trust or Steed’s efforts of
enticement were relevant in determining whether Wall consented to
sexual intercourse.  Because the consent instructions told the
jury that defendant Jeffs’ position of special trust and
defendant Jeffs’ enticement of Wall could give rise to a lack of
consent, they were erroneous.
¶37 Having concluded that the jury instructions on consent
were erroneous, we must consider whether they require reversal of
Jeffs’ convictions.  “[T]o reverse a trial verdict, [we] must
find not a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the
error affected the result.”  Cheves v. Williams , 1999 UT 86,
¶ 20, 993 P.2d 191 (quoting Steffensen v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp. ,
862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993)).  We find such a likelihood
here.
¶38 The consent instruction given to the jury stated:  “An
act of sexual intercourse is without consent of a person under
any, all, or a combination of  the following circumstances
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. . . .” (emphasis added).  It then listed the State’s three
theories of non consent, two of which we have held to be
erroneous.  Because no special verdict form was employed at
trial, the jury was not required to indicate the basis for its
finding that the intercourse between Steed and Wall was
nonconsensual.  We therefore cannot determine with certainty
whether Jeffs was convicted on the basis of the one valid theory,
the two erroneous theories, or on some combination of the three.  
And because there was no real dispute at trial that Jeffs was in
a position of special trust with respect to Wall, a theory we
have held to be erroneous, it is highly likely that Jeffs was
convicted on the basis of an erroneous theory.  Such a likelihood
requires reversal of his convictions and a remand for a new
trial.
C.  The Accomplice Liability Instruction Was Erroneous
¶39 Because we reverse Jeffs’ convictions on the basis of
the erroneous consent instructions, his remaining claims of error
are not dispositive and we need not reach them.  We nevertheless
address his claim that the trial court erroneously instructed the
jury with regard to the mens rea element of the accomplice
liability statute in order to guide the trial court on remand. 
See IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt. , 2003 UT 5, ¶ 10, 73
P.3d 320 (considering nondispositive argument for guidance of the
parties on remand).
¶40 Jeffs asserts that he could not be convicted as an
accomplice to the rape of Wall unless the State proved that he
intended that Steed rape Wall.  At trial, Jeffs unsuccessfully
requested a jury instruction stating that, in order to reach a
conviction, the jury must find that Jeffs “intended that the
result of his conduct would be that Allen Steed rape Elissa
Wall.”  We agree with Jeffs that he was entitled to the requested
instruction.
¶41 The trial court instructed the jury on party liability
as follows:
To convict Warren Jeffs as an accomplice to
the crime of rape, you must find from the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of
the following elements of that crime:
1.  That the defendant, Warren Jeffs:
  a.  intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
solicited, requested, commanded, or
encouraged another–-
    I. to have sexual intercourse
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    ii. with Elissa Wall without consent; or
  b. intentionally aided another–-
    I. to have sexual intercourse 
    ii. with Elissa Wall without consent; and
2.  Allen Steed had sexual intercourse with
Elissa Wall without consent.
¶42 Jeffs argues that one cannot be found guilty as an
accomplice unless he has the required mental state for the
underlying crime to be committed.  In this case, Jeffs argues
that the jury was not adequately instructed of this requirement. 
The State disagrees, pointing out that the instruction properly
informed the jury of the mental state required which, in the case
of rape, is an “intentional, knowing or reckless mental state.” 
State v. Calamity , 735 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1987); see also  Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (“[W]hen the definition of the offense does
not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does not
involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness
shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility.”).  The
problem, however, is that the instruction only indicated that the
reckless, knowing, or intentional mental state attached to the
actions of “solicited, requested, commanded, or encouraged,” not
to the underlying criminal conduct of rape.
¶43 We addressed the requisite mental state under the
accomplice liability statute in State v. Briggs .  2008 UT 75, 197
P.3d 628.  There, we stated that “[a]n accomplice must . . . have
the intent that the underlying offense be committed.”  Id.  ¶ 14. 
“Intent,” as used in this context, is a legal term of art that
means “[t]he state of mind accompanying an act.”  Black’s Law
Dictionary  881 (9th ed. 2009).  It should not be confused with
the mental state designated as “intentionally.”  See  Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-103(1).  To restate the essential principle,
“accomplice liability adheres only when the accused acts with the
mens rea to commit the principal offense.”  State v. Calliham ,
2002 UT 86, ¶ 64, 55 P.3d 573.
¶44 The accomplice liability statute reflects this
principle in the requirement that the defendant act “with the
mental state required for the commission of [the] offense.”  Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-202.  This mandates that the defendant, in this
case one who acts as an accomplice to rape, undertake his actions
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.  But intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly in regard to what?  The obvious answer
is that he must act intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly as to
the results of his conduct.  And in order for criminal liability
to attach, the results of his conduct must be a criminal offense.
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¶45 This principle is further clarified by the statutory
definitions of the possible “mental state[s] required for the
commission of” rape.  Id.   A person acts “[i]ntentionally . . .
with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his
conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage
in the conduct or cause the result.”  Id.  § 76-2-103(1).  Under
this mental state, the accomplice desires to cause rape.  “A
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result.”  Id.  § 76-2-103(2). 
Under this mental state, the accomplice knows that his conduct
will most likely cause rape.  Finally, a person acts
“[r]ecklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur.”  Id.
§ 76-2-103(3).  Under this mental state, the accomplice
recognizes that his conduct could result in rape but chooses to
proceed anyway.  Thus, in specifying that the accomplice act with
the mental state required for the commission of the underlying
offense, the accomplice liability statute clearly contemplates
that the accomplice is aware of, at a minimum, the substantial
and unjustifiable risk that his actions will result in the
commission of a crime--in this case rape--by another person.
¶46 The State urges an alternate interpretation of the
accomplice liability statute, under which one could act
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly in the abstract and incur
criminal liability if his actions resulted in soliciting,
requesting, commanding, encouraging, or intentionally aiding
another in committing a crime.  We reject this alternate
interpretation because it would sweep in too much innocent
behavior.  Taken to its logical extreme, this interpretation
could result in accomplice liability attaching to a person who
leaves his house unlocked, leading to the theft of his own
personal property inside the house.  But we have been careful to
avoid expanding the law to this extent.
¶47 In State v. Comish , we held that a security officer who
purchased marijuana in a sting operation could not be considered
an accomplice for testimonial purposes because “[u]nder [the]
statute and under the [generally accepted meaning of the term,
. . . ‘accomplice’ . . . does not include a person who . . .
merely provides an opportunity for one who is disposed to commit
a crime.”  560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Utah 1977).
¶48 And we have also held that even less innocent behaviors
do not appropriately categorize an individual as an accomplice if
that individual had no intention that the underlying crime be
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committed.  In State v. Schreuder , for example, we held that a
man who knew that a woman wanted to kill her father and who
concealed the murder weapon after the crime was committed was not
an accomplice.  726 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Utah 1986).  In so holding,
we stated that “[p]rior knowledge does not make a person an
accomplice when that person does not have the mental state
required” for the underlying crime.  Id.   While there were
clearly other crimes with which the defendant in Schreuder  could
have been charged, “there was insufficient evidence to establish
that he . . . had the mental state required to commit the crime
[of murder],” and thus he was not an accomplice.  Id.
¶49 We clarify that an accomplice need not act with the
same intent, or mental state, as the principal.  “Party liability
under section 76-2-202 does not require that the persons involved
in the criminal conduct have the same mental state.”  State v.
Alvarez , 872 P.2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994).  “A defendant can be
criminally responsible for an act committed by another, but the
degree of his responsibility is determined by his own mental
state in the acts that subject him to such responsibility, not by
the mental state of the actor.”  State v. Crick , 675 P.2d 527,
534 (Utah 1983) (emphasis omitted).  “[I]t is not necessary for
the accomplice to have the same intent that the principal actor
possessed as long as the accomplice intended that an offense be
committed.”  State v. Briggs , 2008 UT 75, ¶ 14.
¶50 Jeffs was also entitled to his requested instruction
for the independent reason that it was necessary to clarify the
“intentionally aids” portion of the accomplice liability statute. 
In those cases where the defendant solicits, requests, commands,
or encourages another to commit an offense, the accomplice
liability statute incorporates the default mental state of
recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally.  However, in those cases
where the defendant is charged with aiding another in the
commission of the offense, the accomplice liability statute
requires that the defendant’s aiding be “intentional.”  See  Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-202.
¶51 While the jury instruction used in this case did
incorporate the phrase “intentionally aided,” it was nevertheless
confusing with respect to the issue of intent.  As we explained
in Briggs , “To show that a defendant is guilty under accomplice
liability, the State must show that an individual acted with both
the intent that the underlying offense be committed and the
intent to aid the principal actor in the offense.”  2008 UT 75,
¶ 13.  This is precisely the alternate instruction that Jeffs
requested, but was denied.
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¶52 Without Jeffs’ proposed instruction as to intent, the
jury could have convicted Jeffs if it found that Jeffs
“intentionally” did some act, and such intentional act
unintentionally  “aided” Steed in having nonconsensual sexual
intercourse with Wall.  For example, even if Jeffs never intended
for Steed to rape Wall, the jury instruction allowed for the
possibility that he would be found guilty simply because he
intentionally performed the marriage ceremony and the existence
of the marriage aided Steed in raping Wall.  For this reason, the
jury instruction was also erroneous.
CONCLUSION
¶53 Because we hold that the trial court’s instructions to
the jury regarding lack of consent were in error, we reverse
Jeffs’ two convictions of rape as an accomplice and remand for a
new trial.
¶54 We regret the effect our opinion today may have on the
victim of the underlying crime, to whom we do not wish to cause
additional pain.  However, we must ensure that the laws are
applied evenly and appropriately, in this case as in every case,
in order to protect the constitutional principles on which our
legal system is based.  We must guarantee justice, not just for
this defendant, but for all who may be accused of a crime and
subjected to the State’s power to deprive them of life, liberty,
or property hereafter.
¶55 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant,
and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish’s opinion.
¶56 Justice Wilkins sat for oral argument; however, due to
his retirement from this court, did not participate herein.
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that time, the court is going to be in recess.
(Recess taken by the court.)
THE COURT:  The record should reflect that counsel
have approached the Court in chambers and the Court wanted to
make a record with regard to that conversation.  
And Mr. Bautista, why don't I hear from you first and
then I'll hear from Mr. Burmester as well.
MR. BAUTISTA:  Thank you, Your Honor.  I believe
yesterday I had a conversation with the State of their
intention of playing the interview of Mr. Eyre to the jury.
And we had a discussion whether -- some judges don't allow the
video, some judges want -- ask question and answers through
traditional means of a witness.  We discussed that.  I didn't
object to playing of the video, so we played it.
I believe we had a discussion, however, that that
normally does not go back to the jury because that would be
giving them testimony that they can review.  We didn't ever --
I didn't believe, discuss it thoroughly and had an agreement
because I didn't think there was any issue there.  We didn't
raise it to the Court because we didn't think it was an issue.
THE COURT:  And it was not admitted as a separate
exhibit; is that right?
MR. BURMESTER:  It was a separate exhibit.  It was
State's Exhibit 11.
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MR. BURMESTER:  It was admitted.  And as far as the
conversation, I remember the conversation.  I don't remember
saying, thinking about it not going back in particular or it
being the case law or anything, but rather we did in addition,
I'm sure now a discussion about the videos and how it was
going -- how -- we didn't want to send the computer back.  And
so I had just believed we were talking about both videos and we
had that discussion.
THE COURT:  Okay.
MR. BURMESTER:  And you may have had a completely
different understanding in the same meeting.
THE COURT:  Good.  Let me hear from --
MR. BAUTISTA:  Needless to say, unfortunately, I did
not make a record of that.  We didn't ask to make sure that
that was admitted for the record only and not as part of
evidence.
Twenty minutes ago, about 20 minutes ago the jury
came out and asked to see videos.  It didn't occur to me that
they were asking to see that interview.  I thought they were
talking about the traffic.  So we were out here discussing why
are they looking at the traffic accident.  That's after the
fact.  That doesn't -- so we had that discussion.  And then it
occurred to me, oh, my, do they have his interview?  Did that
go back?
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MR. BAUTISTA:  Yes.  So we went back immediately to
speak to either you or the clerks.  I think we asked the clerks
if it went back.  Right there and then the bailiff came around
the corner with the laptop in his hands.  Mr. Burmester said it
might be moot now, and we asked him what video did they watch,
and he said the defendant's interview.
We then brought it to your attention.  I don't
believe that they are supposed to watch that.  I don't believe
that that is allowed to be watched.  It's akin to giving them a
transcript, and it has unfair -- it might put an unfair taint
on the evidence to -- overemphasis on that evidence versus the
others.  The defendant's statements to the police, I believe,
are supposed to be akin to just regular live testimony.
I may have messed up, but I think I am forced to make
a motion to -- for a mistrial because this may have improperly
have an influence on the jury that could have some undue
influence on the verdict.
THE COURT:  Great.  Thank you.  And Mr. Burmester,
let me get the State's input as well.
MR. BURMESTER:  Your Honor, I -- I'm unaware of a
particular case.  There's nothing that says a video interview
can't go back if the case existed.  It may very well.  I would
like permission to research that issue.
And I think we both stipulate that it was about 20
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And I would ask the Court that we allow the case to
continue, take it under advisement.  Once there is a verdict
then, if it's a verdict of not guilty then, of course, it's a
moot issue.  If it's a guilty verdict -- a guilty verdict, then
perhaps we could address the issue and have appropriate
briefing.
THE COURT:  Good.  Tell me, I want to make sure that
Exhibit 11 was the interview.
MR. BURMESTER:  Yeah.  It was.
THE COURT:  And Exhibit 11 was moved to having it
admitted and it was admitted into evidence.  Is that your
understanding?
MR. BURMESTER:  That was my understanding.  Yes, that
was my understanding.
THE COURT:  And with regard to that point, Mr.
Bautista, I'm interested in that.  I mean, whether that was
admissible or not, if, in fact, the parties stipulated to its
admissibility seems like whether you have second thoughts now
that was the appropriate way and there was no harm in the jury
going through it.
MR. BAUTISTA:  My intention was to agree that it be
played to the jury, and that's why I stipulated to its
admission when he did a blanket admission to all of them.  But
it was under the belief that that wouldn't be sent back to the
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error.
THE COURT:  And it appears as if the -- all other
exhibits that were admitted were taken back to the jury room
and given to the jury for purposes for their review and
consideration --
MR. BURMESTER:  I went through all the evidence --
sorry your Honor for stepping in on your conversation -- but,
yes, I went through, and I was the one who put 1 through 11
plus 13 into the pile.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Let's see, Mr. Bautista, assuming
that it was unintended or invited error somehow to do what's
been done here, is there anything we can do at this stage
that's going to correct any perceived concerns that you have?
MR. BAUTISTA:  I'm afraid that if we ask the jury to
come up and gave them another instruction, that that might
inadvertently actually do put undue influence on it.  And so at
this time, I don't believe there's an instruction that can be
given to remedy it.
THE COURT:  Good.
MR. BAUTISTA:  When we went back, I was hoping that
they hadn't started it, and we were going to stop them.
THE COURT:  Good.  And Mr. Burmester, anything we can
do by taking corrective action at this juncture that may
alleviate the issue that we've got?
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It's gone back.  I think that if one listens to the record of
the interview, it is about a 15-minute interview.  And if they
had it about 20 minutes, I don't see them -- possible that they
could have listened to it over and over again.  But as far as
us taking some action now to remedy the problem, I don't see
how we can do that.
THE COURT:  Good.  Thank you, Counsel, for calling
this to the Court's attention.  I appreciate your assistance
with regard to that.
You know, it appears to me as if, at least on its
face, the Exhibit 11 was admitted into evidence and all
admitted evidence was sent back to the jury.  And so I'm -- I'm
not finding that to be something that's inappropriate.  All the
rest of the evidence was sent back there, and the jury has
access to it.  And I advised the jury that every -- all the
exhibits that were admitted, they would be able to read and
review.
With regard to and any larger issue with regard to
any prejudice that may take place or undue influence with
regard to that, the Court is of a mind to reserve that issue,
Mr. Bautista.  And depending upon our -- and allow the
proceedings to go forward.
The Court at this stage would anticipate receiving a
verdict back, assuming it's reached by the jury.  And I think
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you raise this issue, that you did it timely, and the Court
notes that as soon as the issue was raised, that it was timely
raised by defense counsel and the State, and jointly they've
asked it be put on the record and that we deal with the issue
at this point.
Anything else that we need to do to complete that
record, do you think, Mr. Bautista?
MR. BAUTISTA:  Just that my motion for mistrial is
not prosectorial's fault, so prejudice would not attach.
THE COURT:  Thank you.  Mr. Burmester, anything you
think?
MR. BURMESTER:  No, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Good.  And tell me how that would
work if, in fact, we were to go forward and get a verdict, is
there a downside in doing that?
MR. BAUTISTA:  If there is a verdict of guilty and we
brief the issue, if we prevailed on the issue that it should
have been mistried, it would be mistried without prejudice
which would allow the State to retry the case.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Good.  Mr. Burmester, is that your
analysis of this as well?
MR. BURMESTER:  Yes, Your Honor, that's what I would
assume.
THE COURT:  Good.  Let's do that.  And the Court is
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at least on its face that the -- I would anticipate that all
the admitted exhibits would go back and that those, that there
has been no breach with regard to that notion, and the jury has
not done anything improper by reviewing the exhibits that have
been admitted.
With that, we're going to be in recess and I'll
reconvene as soon as we hear from the jury and do so.
MR. BAUTISTA:  Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Thanks.  Thanks, Counsel.
Court's in recess.
(Recess taken by the court.)
THE COURT:  Let's see, ladies and gentlemen, this is
the matter of the State versus Matthew Gordon Eyre.  The record
shall reflect that Mr. Eyre is present as -- and that all
counsel and parties are also present.
I'm advised by our bailiff that the jury has reached
a verdict in this matter.
I would note that we met previously with regard to
the introduction of Exhibit 11.  And as I've looked at the
Exhibit 11 and its potential effect, as I noted previously, it
had been stipulated by all parties to come in.  It was
admitted.  And, frankly, I think the parties have the ability
to stipulate to the admission of most evidence, even evidence
that traditionally doesn't come in at the time of trial.
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that was introduced at trial.  So it's not additional
information.  The jury has not been exposed to anything that's
new or different than what was raised at trial.  And I'll give
you a chance to speak on these with regard to that.  And that
the -- it could also be noted that it was cumulative in the
sense that we heard evidence from other witnesses that also
discussed the issue and that that evidence was introduced and
that the Court doesn't on -- at least on its face of the
introduction of Exhibit 11, find that there's prejudice in
having the jury hear that.  But as I've indicated to you
previously, I'm prepared to reserve that issue with regard to a
mistrial and deal with that.
Mr. Bautista, let me hear you before we leave that
subject as well.
MR. BAUTISTA:  Your Honor, after we, we had our
discussion, I was replaying the video, and it appears that we
stopped it when there was -- according to the screen, it looked
to me like there was still seven more minutes.
THE COURT:  Okay.
MR. BAUTISTA:  There was some more on that tape that
was afterwards mainly from what I saw, a conversation of the
defendant asking him why he was being arrested and taken to
jail and things of that nature.  I haven't finished watching
the rest of it.
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MR. BAUTISTA:  But there may have been some
additional stuff.
THE COURT:  Thank you.  And I appreciate that
clarification.
And Mr. Burmester, anything else you have with regard
to that issue and whether or not the jury had something other
than what was admitted at the time of trial?
MR. BURMESTER:  Yes, he asks the defendant -- the
defendant asks "Am I going to jail?"  And Detective Mount says,
"I don't know.  We're on the phone to talk to the district
attorney."  Beyond that, there is laying on the floor doing
pushups and waiting around for eventual taking him out of the
room and a rest check.
THE COURT:  Is that something that either side sees
as prejudicial at this juncture?  You may be less likely --
MR. BURMESTER:  Yes.
THE COURT:  -- to find prejudice --
MR. BURMESTER:  I definitely find it not prejudicial,
but maybe counsel.
THE COURT:  Anything else I should know on that, Mr.
Bautista, with regards to presently?
MR. BAUTISTA:  I would just ask to reserve it as --
THE COURT:  Okay.  The Court is inclined to do that.
Okay.  With regard to the jury verdict, before
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there should be no reaction to the jury verdict that's read.
Proceedings are not over until court's adjourned.  Regardless
of what the jury may be, the jury is entitled to the same
respect they've been shown during all of these proceedings.
Therefore, there will be no comment about the verdict until
after adjournment.
Anything else we need to raise, Counsel, before we
invite the jury in?  Mr. Burmester?
MR. BURMESTER:  Nothing from the State.
THE COURT:  Anything from the Defense?
MR. BAUTISTA:  Not for the Defense.
THE COURT:  Thank you.  Let's invite our jury to come
join us.
(Pause in proceedings.)
THE COURT:  Please be seated.
This is the matter of State versus Matthew Gordon
Eyre.  The record should reflect that all parties and counsel
are present and as well as all eight of our jurors.  And it's
my understanding that our jury has reached a verdict in this
case.
And before we receive that verdict, let me express
appreciation to our jury on behalf of all of us for the
outstanding work you've undertaken.  We appreciate the care and
attention you've had in carefully following and listening to
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MR. BAUTISTA:  May we address the Matthew Eyre
matter, please?
THE COURT:  Ear or Eyre?
MR. BAUTISTA:  Oh, it is Eyre.  I'm sorry.
THE COURT:  Let's see, this is the Matthew Eyre
matter.  The record should reflect that Mr. Eyre is present as
well as all counsel.  I've got a presentence report.  Any
additions or corrections in that report, Mr. Bautista?
MR. BAUTISTA:  Not to the presentence report, Your
Honor.
THE COURT:  Okay.
MR. BAUTISTA:  But before we get there, we'd like to
address -- we received a copy of the Court's ruling and order
regarding the motion for a mistrial.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Good.  Thank you.
MR. BAUTISTA:  And if I may just have the benefit of
the record, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  You may.  Go ahead.
MR. BAUTISTA:  We anticipated that we were actually
going to have a brief oral argument today on this and neither
party submitted a notice to request.
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MR. BAUTISTA:  We didn't request oral arguments
because my practice and normal understanding is in criminal
cases that we get oral arguments.  I understand --
THE COURT:  Well, I want to give you the benefit of
the record.
MR. BAUTISTA:  I understand the Court's ruling.  I
intended to argue that I don't believe that this is harmless
error, and the reason for that is in this case the jury was
deliberating for some time, and it was only when they requested
the C- -- a video, a computer, it went back there with them.
Moments later I was confused why they would want to see the
traffic cam videos, and I inquired as to what videos did they
want to look at.  And then I asked that his interview -- if his
interview had gone back to the jury, and I was informed it was.
We immediately came back to chambers to discuss this
with you.  The court bailiff came out with a computer in his
hands, and we asked what video did the jury look at, and we
were told his interview.
It was shortly thereafter, I don't remember the exact
time period, but I think it was shortly thereafter that the
jury came back with a guilty verdict.  And so this is why I
don't believe it is harmless.  I think because the jury was
deliberating for some time, they were having obviously some
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They heard his interview at the trial, but one of the
reasons why we don't give them transcripts and we don't give
them, is it allows them to rehear evidence presented.  If they
missed evidence or if they have a dispute of what the evidence
is, it's for them to deliberate and for them to come to a
conclusion.  If they cannot come to a conclusion, then the
defendant is entitled to an acquittal because they are not able
to come to a conclusion that he is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
We believe that by them watching his video again,
they were able to quash any questions they had whatsoever about
what statements he may have said, or they may have heard it
differently or something to that effect.  And it was outside of
an opportunity to address it more in an additional closing
argument.
With that in mind, that's why we do not believe it is
harmless error.  It emphasized too much of what he was saying
and not what the other evidence was.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Good.  Mr. Burmester, any response
from the State?
MR. BURMESTER:  The State joins in the Court's
ruling, and also for the reasons stated in the State's brief.
I would like to also add that there was no
distinction made at any time between any items of evidence.
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the jury could not access anything that was extraneous.  And
the time it was out to the jury was the approximate length of
the questioned recording.  And for the reasons that Defense
counsel state, it might have, it might have, it is clearly
not -- well, it is as the Court said.  So we would join in
that.
THE COURT:  Thank you.  And let's see, the Court's
looked at this closely.  I appreciate the argument that's
additionally provided here and finding that it's -- that
prejudice has not been established and that for the reasons the
Court has denied the motion, the Court is confirming that
response to the State's motion at this point in time.  And
therefore, denying the defendant's motion.
And the Court's prepared to proceed with regard to
sentencing.  And let's see, Mr. Bautista, I'm interested in
knowing if there's any additions or corrections to the
presentence?
MR. BAUTISTA:  There are not, Your Honor.  We are
ready to proceed and no legal reason for sentencing not to go
forward.
THE COURT:  And Mr. Burmester, let me hear from the
State first, and then I'd like to hear from defense counsel.  I
don't know if you have any victims that are here that wish to
be heard at this point in time.
MR. BURMESTER:  They are not here.  
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
00915
